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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Style and Substance: 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and U.S. – French Relations, 1938-1942. 
(August 2004) 
Clayton R. Baird, BA, University of Tennessee 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. H.W. Brands 
 
 
 Historians of American diplomatic history during the Roosevelt administration 
have long debated whether President Roosevelt tricked Americans into the Second 
World War.  Historians have looked at the personalities of Roosevelt and his key 
advisors to see if a hidden agenda was followed.  U.S.-French relations highlight this 
divide.  Did Roosevelt conspire in the fall of France, as the conspiratorialists claim, or 
did he simply react?   
With most historians focusing on Roosevelt himself, few have examined the 
systemic causes of America’s failure to aid France.  This study investigates how 
Roosevelt’s style of governance and administration affected American foreign policy 
toward France.  It concludes that the system of foreign-policy-making Roosevelt 
established made the outcome of American policy toward France—in particular the fall 
of France in 1940—nearly inevitable. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:  
THE CONTINUING DEBATE 
 
Introduction 
According to William L. Langer, the fall of France in 1940 was “one of the few 
catastrophic events in history.”1  America’s entry into World War II has been the topic 
of continuous, contentious debate ever since.  Yet few authors have delved into 
Washington’s relations with France, Instead, most scholars have concentrated on 
America’s policies toward Britain, Germany, and Japan.  Nonetheless, American-French 
relations highlight the evolving interpretations of how the United States entered the 
conflict.  As conspiratorialist historians point out, during this period, U.S. foreign policy 
appeared to falter, the foreign policy establishment collapsed, and FDR appeared to let 
France go to her doom. 
Yet U.S.-French relations highlight the inner workings of Roosevelt’s foreign 
policy well.  Being the largest continental democracy, historians studying this diplomatic 
relationship can see how FDR structured his agenda and who he chose to carry it out.  
While most historians have debated whether or not FDR knowing pushed America into 
war, few have looked at the structure of his administration. 
 
                                                 
 This thesis follows the style of the Journal for Diplomatic History.  
     1 William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (Hamden: Archon, 1947), 3-10. 
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Historiography 
Straying from the historiography of American foreign policy in general, the 
schools of thought regarding American relations with France have evolved slowly and 
simultaneously.  Works in this area have lacked the revisionism and counter-revisionism 
characteristic of the history of diplomacy as a whole.2    The few works that have looked  
at the fall of France and America’s role in it have evolved from a traditional 
interpretation to one that focused on Roosevelt’s internationalism.  Some writers went as 
far as to argue that FDR actively sought to engage America in the war and that the 
French case was indicative of FDR's conniving and deceiving in order to get America 
into the fight.  However, other scholars have argued that Roosevelt was naïve, passive, 
or not in full control of his advisors.  These scholars focused on the systemic flaws of the 
foreign policy establishment.  In their view, FDR became the victim of bureaucratic 
problems and infighting.  The most recent scholarship has contended that FDR’s style of 
governance, while excellent in domestic politics, had a detrimental effect on foreign 
affairs and caused the problems the other schools have pointed to. 
 The schools of thought have swung like a pendulum between traditional and 
conspiratorial theories of why FDR took the actions he did.  The first school of thought 
to appear after World War II was the traditional school.  As is the case much of the time, 
the works represented in this school follow the consensus tradition and do not directly 
attack the administration.  The traditional historical interpretation of America’s relations 
                                                 
     2 Mark A, Stoler,  “A Half-Century of Conflict: Interpretations of World War II Diplomacy,” in 
America in the World: The Historiography of American foreign Relations Since 1941,  ed. Michael J. 
Hogan (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 166-168.  
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with France centered on Roosevelt’s attempts to strengthen America and support the 
western democracies.  Most histories in this school portrayed the administration as 
merely reacting to events in Europe.   
William Langer’s Our Vichy Gamble (1947) set the tone for future debate in this 
area.  Langer argued just after the war that the fall of France took the Americans by 
surprise.  According to Langer, criticisms of Roosevelt’s policies came from ideological 
opponents on the right.  Langer and Everett Gleason’s Challenge to Isolationism (1952) 
and The Undeclared War (1953) continued the trend of this early work.  William Langer 
and Gleason argued in their expansive Challenge to Isolationism that Roosevelt’s efforts 
could have produced better results.  They pointed to the fact that Roosevelt had to 
contend with public opinion that while supportive of the Allies after 1939, strongly 
desired to stay out of European affairs.3  The authors went as far as to say that Roosevelt 
preferred to leave Europe alone and pursue strictly American interests.  They felt that 
Roosevelt thus acted reluctantly toward Europe.   
William Henry Chamberlain echoed Langer’s view in America’s Second Crusade 
(1950).  Chamberlain made it a point to illustrate the domestic forces Roosevelt 
contended with.  A “peace bloc” existed in Congress that overreacted in Chamberlain’s 
view.4  Roosevelt wanted peace, yet believed that America had to balance the scales to 
secure it. While publicly voicing a policy that excluded open aid, Chamberlain 
contended that Roosevelt sought to coerce the Germans into line with implied threats.  
                                                 
     3 William L. Langer & Everret Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism: 1937-1940 (New York:  Harper 
Brother, 1952), 36. 
     4 William Henry Chamberlain, America’s Second Crusade (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1950), 
100-104. 
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Over a decade later, Robert Divine echoed these assessments in The Reluctant 
Belligerent (1965).  Divine’s short but clear analysis of American relations with France 
stressed Roosevelt’s desire to avoid American involvement in the war.5  Divine’s central 
thesis revolved around the argument that events pulled Roosevelt into a position of 
supporting war.   
Cordell Hull’s Memoirs (1948) supported the traditional interpretation of 
Roosevelt’s character by painting Roosevelt as a reactionary leader.  However, his 
analysis opened the door for critical review of the actions of the president’s advisors.  
Hull’s Memoirs, along with Admiral William Leahy’s I Was There (1950), illustrated the 
detrimental effect of Roosevelt’s advisors on American-French relations.  As more 
information became available, such as Ambassador William Bullitt’s personal letters to 
Roosevelt, works such as Julian Hurstfield’s America and the French Nation (1986) 
solidified this new historical interpretation into one that viewed systemic factors as the 
cause of American inaction. 
 Like Hull’s memoir, Leahy’s autobiography helped opened up the study of the 
effect of Roosevelt’s advisors.  Later scholars such as Hurstfield synthesized Leahy’s 
observations into the tenets of this new school.  In Leahy’s view, France was a far 
different place than he expected.  Going to France, Leahy had instructions from 
Roosevelt to at least hold the Vichy government to the treaty obligations it had with the 
United States.  After arriving, Leahy concluded the task to be impossible.6  The Germans 
                                                 
     5  Robert A Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1965), 3. 
     6 William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950), 59-66. 
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could seize the Fleet any time they wished.  The Petain regime had no real power even 
within the unoccupied zone.  Although Leahy’s account is a dark description of the state 
of affairs in France, this description pointed out that previous American accounts had 
been factually false and misled Washington. 
 Whereas Leahy concentrated mainly on the post-armistice situation, Hurstfield’s 
latter analysis took Leahy’s observations and tied them to a breakdown in American 
diplomacy.  For Hurstfield, this breakdown came in the person of Ambassador William 
Bullitt, Leahy’s predecessor.  Hurstfield was one of the first to argue a systemic cause 
for American diplomatic failures.  Dedicating much of his book to Bullitt’s influence, 
Hurstfield still did not connect how Bullitt’s influence stemmed from his relationship 
with Roosevelt as his “man on the ground in France.”7   
 Just as the traditionalists began to write that Roosevelt sincerely tried to avoid 
war, the pendulum swung the other direction.  Conspiracy historians put forth a simple 
answer to the question of why the Roosevelt administration did nothing to stop France’s 
defeat.  FDR tried to get the United States involved in the war from the beginning.  
Charles C. Tansill’s Back Door to War (1952) reflected the early thought of this 
historical interpretation.  Tansill argued that in 1938, Roosevelt lied to Congress and the 
American people when FDR stated that isolation was “dangerous to American neutrality, 
American security, and American peace” According to Tansill, this line of argument was 
illogical and laughable.8   
                                                 
     7 Julian G. Hurstfield,  America and the French Nation: 1939-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 1986), 3-4; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillian, 1948), 637. 
    8 Charles C. Tansill,  Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy; 1933-1941 (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1952),  562. 
 6
 
 President Roosevelt becomes an outright villain for scholars in this school 
because he sold out the French.  Tansill’s book, along with Hamilton Fish’s FDR: The 
Other Side of the Coin (1976) and Tragic Deception (1984), argued that Roosevelt had 
made promises to the French that he could not keep nor had any intentions of keeping.  
Fish argued that even before the war in Europe began, the Allies could have secured 
peace with Germans by not aggravating the situation.  Roosevelt determined the fate of 
France with his stance on the question of Poland, especially Danzig, and how the Allies 
should have responded.  Acquiring Danzig could have placated the Germans and robbed 
Hitler of an excuse for war.  Fish contended in both books that both the President and 
Congress knew that the Allies needed time to rearm and prepare.9  Fish claimed that 
Roosevelt, the master politician, tricked Congress and America into war.  The President 
used the situation in France as leverage against his domestic opponents at home.   
At the same time, Roosevelt used France as a proxy against Germany.  
According to Fish and Tansill, the gambit paid off.  As France crumbled, Roosevelt used 
the shift in public sentiment to change America’s stance over aid.  Both authors pointed 
to Cash and Carry and Lend-Lease as examples of this victory.10  Tansill put forth that 
Roosevelt hoped the fall of France would trigger American involvement in the war.11  
                                                 
     9 Hamilton Fish,  FDR: The Other Side of the Coin (New York: Vantage, 1976), 45-48. 
Hamilton Fish served as a ranking Republican from New York on the House Foreign Affairs and House 
Rules committees ate this time.  He ardently opposed both the New Deal domestic programs and FDR’s 
foreign policy.  He would later travel to Europe in 1940 on a private peace mission that was not sanctioned 
by the administration.  He has authored two books calling FDR’s policies into question and whether they 
have damaged the nation. 
     10 Fish, FDR, 70; Tansill, Back Door to War, 603. 
     11 Tansill, Back Door to War, 602-617. 
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Fish and others fought against such a move.  Both Fish and Tansill went on to argue that 
Roosevelt maneuvered Japan into taking the first shot.12  France’s collapse had primed 
American public sentiment.  The Japanese attack only broke down the last isolationist 
barrier. 
 Although some authors in this school of interpretation attack Roosevelt’s war-
like policies from the political left because the war shifted focus away from domestic 
programs to military spending, most subscribers of this school come from the political 
right.  Tansill’s Back Door to War shows the effect of anticommunism and suspicion of 
those around Roosevelt that became endemic in the post-war era.  Breaking with the 
traditional interpretation that the Axis alone caused the Second World War, Tansill 
argued that Stalin played a large role.  In the end, World War II allowed Stalin to 
conquer half of Europe.  Recent books and articles, such as Patrick Buchanan’s A 
Republic, Not an Empire, contained similar arguments that have drawn from this school.  
Conspiracy historians argued that the New Deal-socialist conspiracy lies at the heart of 
Roosevelt’s dealings.13 
 Even with the apparent political biases, the conspiratorial school of thought made 
good points.  They effectively destroyed the notion that Roosevelt merely responded to 
events in Europe.  Roosevelt’s interventionism in these books called into question the 
traditionalists’ idea that Roosevelt sought peace and acted only to contain Axis 
aggression.  Most importantly, this interpretation brought the question of what did 
                                                 
     12 Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR & America’s Involvement in World War II (Greenwich: 
Devin-Adair, 1983), 13-21; Tansill, Back Door to War, 619-630. 
     13 Tansill, Back Door to War, 525-557. 
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Roosevelt know about France back to the forefront.  Just as the traditional school caused 
the backlash just described, the backlash spawned a backlash of its own in turn.  The 
new defenders of American policy, however, accepted many of the claims made by the 
conspiratorial school of thought.  The most obvious concerned the amount of surprise 
Washington felt when France collapsed.  T.R. Fehrenbach’s FDR’s Undeclared War 
(1967) and Robert Dallek’s Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-
1945 (1979) illustrated the shift from the original traditionalists’ view. 
 Fehrenbach argued that the fall of France acted as a wake up call to 
Washington.14  This historical interpretation did not see France’s collapse as a Pearl 
Harbor that did not sway public opinion enough.  Up until this time, American policy 
had tried to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Europe.  The neo-
traditionalists rebuked the idea that the Roosevelt administration tried to prod America 
into war.  Dallek and others countered the claim by the conspiracy school that Roosevelt 
prepared for involvement by aiding the Allies with armaments such as aircraft in two 
ways.  The neo-traditionalists added to the traditional argument that Roosevelt sought to 
balance the scales in Europe.  Ambassador Bullitt did not lead the administration astray 
in this interpretation.  Instead, Bullitt’s assessment of the quality of the French air force 
led Roosevelt to ask Congress for approval to expand aircraft production at home and 
build factories in Canada to hide the fact that the planes were American.15 
                                                 
     14 T.R. Fehrenbach,  FDR’s Undeclared War: 1939-1941 (New York: David McKay, 1967), 96. 
     15 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy: 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 172. 
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The new traditionalists stressed Roosevelt’s idea of an arsenal for democracy.  
According to this school, the administration did not try to step in to stop the fall of 
France because America was “the arsenal, not the arbiter of democracy.”16  Neo-
traditionalists attacked those in the “peace bloc,” like Fish, who hampered Roosevelt’s 
attempt to aid the Allies.  For this school, isolationists overreacted. The new traditional 
school decried the efforts of isolationists because they impeded legitimate defense needs.  
Dallek pointed to the plans by the administration to use foreign arms orders to rev up 
American industry.17  If industry had tooled up and already began to produce munitions, 
American needs could be met if the need arose.   
Dallek also argues that Roosevelt acted as a shrewd politician by avoiding the 
pitfalls that Wilson encountered by making World War I a moral crusade.  Instead, in 
Dallek’s opinion, FDR tried to base his policies on practicality since Congress and 
public sentiment limited him.18  In this manner, neo-traditionalist argued that Roosevelt 
followed a clearly defensive policy limited by his opponents by preparing America for 
defense, not war. 
This school had some of the same failings as its historiographical forebears.  
While its practitioners do not totally defend the President, their claims of preemptive 
defense almost destroyed their argument.  With their acceptance of Roosevelt’s 
knowledge of French weakness and plans for aid, neo-traditionalists came within a hair’s 
width of the conspiracy school’s argument.  The new traditional interpretation also did 
                                                 
     16 Fehrenbach, FDR’s Undeclared War: 1939-1941, 44. 
     17 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 175-178. 
     18 Robert Dallek, “Roosevelt as World Leader,” The American Historical Review 76, no. 5 (December 
1961): 1503-1513.  
 10
not absolve the President of all his critics’ charges.  Fehrenbach echoed many 
contemporary critics of Johnson, by saying that Roosevelt’s usurpation of power from 
Congress left enduring marks on American presidential politics.  In the final analysis, the 
neo-traditionalists tried to save the traditional interpretation by co-opting tenets from the 
opposing side.   
 There appeared to be no consensus among the three basic schools of thought.  
This impasse had left historians asking the same questions.  Did the Roosevelt 
administration try to prod America into war or prevent that involvement?  Roosevelt’s 
actions seemed contradictory.  His knowledge of the situation in France remained a point 
of contention.  Did his advisors shape his irregular diplomatic course?  These questions 
remained as a holdover from a fifty-year debate. 
 
Lingering Questions 
No matter where a historian rests politically, the answers to these questions rest 
at the feet of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  No President in American history 
has been as politically charged historically.  Defenders of Roosevelt argue that he had to 
react to the crisis at hand, as Langer and Gleason contend.  However, they fail to see that 
the need to react to the catastrophe stemmed from Roosevelt’s actions before France’s 
collapse.  Churchill’s close relationship could have given impetus to the drift toward 
war.19  Yet, Roosevelt had a strong disposition and was not influenced easily.  Although 
                                                 
     19 Chamberlain, America’s Second Crusade, 79. 
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many in his inner circle supported aggressive action against Germany, Roosevelt still 
controlled the direction of policy. 
 The historical debate has centered mainly on Roosevelt’s intentions.  On one end 
of the spectrum are those who hold he tried to defend democracy and freedom from 
tyranny.  Others have argued that prewar policy centered on finding an excuse to enter 
the war.  Roosevelt’s policies appear erratic in hindsight and many times contradictory.  
FDR pleaded for peace while signaling unconditional support to France (and Britain).20  
Opponents argued that this maneuvering placed the United States inexorably on the path 
to war.  Some conspiratorialists go as far as to question FDR’s patriotism.  Even those 
most likely to support FDR, such as Charles Beard, saw Roosevelt’s policies as a de 
facto deception and a broken promise.21     
However, the evidence at hand hardly backs up the claims made first by 
Hamilton Fish and later by a whole school of historians that Roosevelt tricked 
American’s into war.  Roosevelt left little in the form of records.  He spoke to his aides 
and communicated his wishes during these meetings.  Historians have had to rely on his 
speeches and comments to the press.  Historians of all stripes have taken these sources 
and stressed those that support their case.  The very fact that FDR stated his desire for 
peace, yet seemingly prepared for war, backs the conspiracy theorists.  Yet speeches are 
for public consumption and, by necessity, give broad hopes and only general intentions. 
This leaves the historian to rely upon the record of what those close to FDR thought he 
                                                 
     20 Fish, Tragic Deception, 90-92. 
     21 Charles Beard, “Roosevelt Deceived the Public” in The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II, ed. 
Robert Dallek (Malabar: Robert E. Krieger Publishing, 1970), 12-14. 
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was planning.  Nonetheless, many historians question the value of the memoirs of those 
around Roosevelt.  As William Chamberlain acknowledges, “a note of self-justification 
almost inevitably intrudes in the recollections of active participants in such a momentous 
historical era.”22   
This leaves historians of this era in a quandary.  Did FDR conspire to enter the 
war, as conspiratorialists claim, and use the French as a sacrificial lamb to justify placing 
the country on a collision course with Germany?  Are traditionalists right in arguing that 
Roosevelt reacted to an unfolding crisis.  As with most conspiracies, FDR’s intentions 
cannot be proven.  Yet historians have overlooked an explanation that does lie in the 
documentary evidence.  Instead of trying to discern what was in Roosevelt’s mind, 
historians should look at the structure of FDR’s administration.  How Roosevelt 
conducted foreign policy and whom he relied on mirrors how he pushed his New Deal 
policies through Congress.  Roosevelt’s role in America’s largest foreign policy crisis 
before America’s entry into the Second World War had some of its roots in his style of 
governing.  Hamilton Fish notes that FDR had a magnetic personality that he had 
cultivated for the sole purpose of disarming opponents and cultivating “friends.”23  
Roosevelt’s “friends” or allies consisted of those he thought he could use for advice, 
information, or would loyally carry out his agenda. 
  Historians trying to see who was pro-war and isolationist have studied the 
makeup of Roosevelt’s administration in-depth.  The makeup of FDR’s administration 
had direct and discernible effects on foreign policy.  FDR was both highly partisan and 
                                                 
     22 Chamberlain, America’s Second Crusade, vii. 
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practical.  This explains why a New Dealer such as Sumner Welles acted as Under 
Secretary of State to Republican Cordell Hull.  The administration seemed filled with 
men of strong wills, egos, and separate agendas.  The meddling of inexperienced New 
Dealers in the affairs of foreign policy professionals caused many problems for 
American foreign policy, as the two groups did not see eye to eye.  While the New 
Dealers were incredibly loyal to the President, they chafed under the normal rules that 
governed foreign affairs.  Political intrigue within the State Department and abroad 
hampered policy and interfused personal politics.  The political battles within and 
between departments destroyed the traditional foreign policy establishment’s abilities to 
analyze and “filter” information from overseas.  The handicapped foreign policy 
establishment became the tool of those willing to exploit it.   
Those outside Washington contributed their fair share, as well.  Roosevelt’s 
preference for men such as William Bullitt and Joseph Kennedy who were from the 
same social class as FDR and loyal New Dealers led to misperceptions within the 
administration about what was happening in Europe.  These men circulated at the 
highest levels of French and British society.  Their disdain for getting to know lower 
functionaries blinded them to some problems and heightened their sense to others.  The 
poor picture that these men gave to FDR compounded the fact that the President relied 
solely on personal interaction in many cases.   
    
                                                                                                                                                
     23 Fish, FDR, 3-5. 
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A New Perspective 
Historians should look at what their academic brethren have studied in political 
science.  Instead of concentrating on personality, historians need to look at style.  
Alexander George and others have argued that how foreign policy is carried out affects 
the outcome as much as the policy and can affect what that policy actually is.  George 
and Irving Janis argue that policy makers, especially those in crises situations, tend to 
limit their choices and rely on a small group of advisors.24  Since he came in dealing 
with the Great Depression, Roosevelt operated in crisis mode from day one.  Similarly, 
Jeral Rosati points out that decision makers in times of crisis tend to prefer ad hoc 
channels of communication over normal channels.25  As both defenders and opponents 
of Roosevelt have noted, he was already predisposed to dealing with people in person.   
Although previous authors never made the full connection between domestic 
politics and foreign affairs, FDR used his same modus operandi in dealing with his 
ambassadors, advisors and officials in the same manner that he used governing the New 
Deal agencies.  Historians of this period need to look at Roosevelt’s governing style.  
This could lead to a new consensus about why the administration acted as it did just as 
France fell before their eyes.  As Hamilton Fish noted in FDR: the Other Side of the 
Coin, Roosevelt was the “master politician” who played a cat and mouse game with 
Congress over domestic policy.  
                                                 
     24 Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information 
and Advice (Boulder: Westview, 1980), 80-91; Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological 
Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos (New York, 1972), 9-11. 
Janis argues that policy makers fall victim to “groupthink” or a set of ideas that becomes isolated from 
what is really going on.  Thus decisions are made without considering current events.   
 15
Supporters and opponents, alike, gave FDR’s style of personal governance 
grudging respect.  In this way, Roosevelt played both sides against the middle and 
guided his domestic policies through the political minefield.  Similarly, FDR could 
control his strong-willed subordinates by pitting them against each other.  All the while 
he was doing this, Roosevelt appeared to be above the fray.  He attempted to replicate 
this in his conduct of foreign policy.  However, this one-on-one interaction had dire 
consequences for American foreign policy on two levels.   
First, FDR dealt directly with those in the midst of the events the administration 
was dealing with.  Presidents before and since have done this, but not to the extent FDR 
did.  Without going through the normal channels, FDR received facts in the raw.  This 
may sound good, but this raw information included the aide’s, advisor’s, or 
ambassador’s personal bias and limitations.  Without the alternative sources, the allies’ 
misperceptions of German and Allied needs and abilities became those of the United 
States.  When war finally broke, the sheer panic and frustration of the allied 
governments was transmitted directly into American politics.   
 Second, since many within the administration had personal contact with FDR 
outside of normal channels, this accelerated the breakdown of the normal establishment.  
Roosevelt’s desire to speak with people directly encouraged backbiting and political 
power struggles within the administration.  One department or individual did not know 
what others were doing.  Having access to the president made some officials overstep  
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their authority.  Many opponents of FDR cite Ambassador to France, William Bullitt’s 
assurances of aid to the French as proof of Roosevelt’s machinations toward war.  
However, these assurances are a perfect example of Bullitt thinking he was acting in the 
spirit of Roosevelt when he may not have been.  Others, like Sumner Welles, used this 
personal contact to pursue an agenda of their own that conflicted with signals others 
were sending within the administration.  Confusion was the obvious outcome.  The 
administration appeared to have no concrete plan of action.  Both ally and potential 
enemy alike could not tell what America’s intentions truly were. 
 Other nations received further confusing messages by American moral 
diplomacy.  Roosevelt attempted to duplicate his domestic success with the fireside chats 
by taking his message of peace to the people of the world.  He sent pleas to all of 
Europe’s leaders, asked the Pope to plead his case, and through speeches attempted to 
bring his moral weight to bear.  Yet neither domestic politics nor moral pressures bound 
Hitler and Mussolini.  Roosevelt’s pleas made America appear weak to the dictators of 
Europe and made France and Britain question the nation’s fortitude.   
 The confusion ran both directions.  The Roosevelt administration received, what 
in hindsight, appears a confusing picture of the European situation.  The documentary 
evidence shows that FDR felt the French to be the senior partner in the Allied 
relationship.  Britain appeared weak with the possibility of folding under the stress.  This 
view helps explain why France became the center of American planning.  Yet the 
weaknesses of France would be highlighted by the test of war.  Even as France fell, the 
Roosevelt administration continued to misperceive the situation until it was too late. A 
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reshuffling of American personnel after the fall would allow the administration and 
future historians to see the error in administration’s judgment. 
As Stephen G. Bunch points out, Roosevelt tried to fight the war with minimum 
political and material effort.  According to Bunch, “FDR was clearly attracted to the idea 
of such a war of limited means.”26  Roosevelt knew he could not ask America to risk a 
repeat of the First World War.  Thus FDR centered his policy first on trying to prevent 
war without compromising too much with the Nazis.  When this failed, American policy 
shifted to trying to achieve a desirable outcome while limiting the scope of the conflict.27 
To this end, Roosevelt approached foreign policy in the same manner he crafted 
New Deal policy.  He relied on sending out “trial balloons” intending to measure the 
scope of his political latitude.  In domestic politics, Roosevelt would make grand 
pronouncements, but compromised with his political opponents in the end.28  In this 
way, FDR always kept his options open.  Roosevelt, as a smart politician kept these 
maneuvers secret.  When he risked exposure, the President would deny involvement.  An 
example of Roosevelt’s secrecy is well illustrated in a note sent to Attorney General 
Adolph Berle.  In the note, Roosevelt decries Berle’s tendency to put “highly indiscrete” 
information in his letters that may contain policy moves.29  Most of FDR’s letters to key 
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officials asked only that they talk to him in person on certain matters.  Thus, Roosevelt 
kept a tight lid on what he was doing.    
Nonetheless, this produced contradictory messages coming from the White 
House.  Thomas Fleming, a conspiratorialist, backed up his analysis in The New 
Dealers’ War (2001) when he argued that the administration had a split personality at 
times.30  This ability to hide his true intentions came from years of political 
maneuvering.  By looking at Roosevelt’s style of governing, one can understand why the 
schools of thought disagree.  In a way, all of the schools have correct observations.  
Roosevelt had a personal, engaged style.   
The President would often choose men to champion his different policy 
initiatives.  Roosevelt liked men from a similar background to his own, with strong wills 
and egos.  Many firmly believed in what they advocated in the President’s name.  Thus 
the contradictory nature of Roosevelt’s foreign policy pitted diplomat against diplomat.  
In cases such as those of William Bullitt and Sumner Welles, this competition would 
have dire consequences for American foreign policy. 
As Hamiliton Fish noted, however, Roosevelt was not well-read and relied on 
advice on those around him.31  This explains how someone like Bullitt or Welles had 
such an impact on Roosevelt’s views of Europe and France.  He abhorred normal 
channels and communicated with them directly without the normal filtering process of 
the foreign policy establishment.  Thus the President received raw information that could 
                                                 
     30 Thomas J. Fleming, The New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War within World War II 
(New York: Basic Books, 2001), 34-48. 
     31 Fish, FDR, 2. 
 19
have been erroneous.  The President also pulled Hull and other administrators close to 
him and away from their respective departments.  The State Department thus became 
susceptible to factions and infighting.  This destroyed alternate sources of information 
and exacerbated the problem.  
 Both Tansill and Fish noted the dual nature of Roosevelt’s policies.  Both authors 
took the contradictory nature of the president’s policies and speeches to suggest that a 
hidden agenda existed.  If taken in context to how Roosevelt maneuvered, however, his 
dual personality makes perfect sense.  Fleming pointed out that the President often made 
statements that did not reflect his true motives.32  While this fact may have strengthened 
the conspiracy school, it could be taken as a way to keep political opponents off balance.  
In foreign affairs, Roosevelt acted in the same manner that he had in the domestic 
sphere.  Yet while this type of politics served Roosevelt well pushing through the New 
Deal, it only sent confusing signals as Cordell Hull noted.   
The President believed he could prop up the Allies with minimum political 
capital, both goad and coerce the Germans, and come out on top.  He failed to 
understand that Hitler, Churchill, and Reynaud had different constituencies.  Roosevelt’s 
personal style also engendered suspicion.  Politicians and political opponents alike 
understood Roosevelt’s style.  Although he did not criticize Roosevelt directly for his 
style, Hamilton Fish’s description of FDR shows both the contempt and respect that 
opponents held for the President.  This wariness helped fuel the isolationist sentiment 
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that traditionalists and neo-traditionalist condemned in their books.  In a manner, 
Roosevelt created his own opposition. 
Yet Roosevelt’s domestic opposition still operated in the same system that he 
did.  In trying to persuade the Fascists to accept a peaceful solution, FDR forgot that he 
dealt with authoritarians.  In doing so, Roosevelt’s moral diplomacy only added to the 
confusion and made America look weak.    
 
Method of Argument 
The interpretation that stresses Roosevelt’s governing style appears to answer 
more questions than it raises, unlike the previous schools.  In this approach, U.S.-French 
relations are a case to be studied to highlight FDR’s overall method of conducting 
foreign policy.  An added benefit comes from the systemic approach being less 
politically charged as those schools that stress looking at personalities and policies.  
Although it condemns Roosevelt’s mode, the governing style argument does not 
necessarily pass judgment on the President’s motives.  In short, it cannot answer whether 
Roosevelt acted or reacted.  The evidence in existence can show how Roosevelt 
operated, but is lacking when it comes to whether he had a secret motive to push 
America into war.  One could still side with either traditionalists or conspiracy authors.  
The problem arises from there being no “smoking gun” evidence either way.   
The governing style school can explain why Roosevelt voiced both 
interventionist sentiment and isolationist sentiment simultaneously, but cannot establish 
which was his true motivation.  This approach uses much of the same evidence as 
 21
previous works.  However, by looking at whom Roosevelt tasked with what role and 
what methods American policymakers used while dealing with France between the 
Munich agreement and the fall of France, the systemic flaws in Roosevelt’s policies 
should become apparent.  By also looking at the aftereffects and how American 
policymakers had to adjust, the approach will allow a different perception and thus new 
analysis.   
 While many historians may feel that a structural analysis should be best left to 
political scientists, historians are obligated to explore all possible explanations to why 
America was not prepared for France’s fall before Germany.  This approach cannot 
explain whether Roosevelt broke promises to Americans as Beard claims or planned for 
war from the start.  The evidence just is not there to know fully what FDR’s plans were. 
Again, a structural approach can clear the air.  By explaining how the politically gifted 
Roosevelt made policies on the assumption that foreign politics were tantamount to 
domestic politic with a larger audience, historians can clear a way so that future 
historians can delve deeper into Roosevelt’s intentions.         
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CHAPTER II  
THE GREAT WAR, MUNICH, AND THE APPROACH OF WAR, 
SEPTEMBER 1938-JULY 1939 
 
 In order to understand U.S.-French relations before World War II, one must 
understand the Munich agreement and the lasting effects of the previous world war.  
Many historians have noted that the Munich agreement came from European hopes to 
avoid another war.  While not playing a role in Munich directly, American policy 
makers hoped the agreement would help avoid war and maintain order in Europe.  While 
interested in the affairs of Europe, most Americans saw no reason to reenter European 
politics.  With most Americans against involvement, Congress effectively stripped 
President Roosevelt of most of his means to conduct foreign policy, by passing the 
Neutrality Act of 1937.1  With this public attitude, the Roosevelt Administration 
continued to hope it could help maintain peace in a time war seemed certain.  
 
Anxiety and Lost Hopes of Munich 
America’s diplomatic “phony war” with Germany began with the Munich 
Agreement of 1938.  In the fall of 1938, Europe braced for war as what seemed the last 
in a series of crises gripped the continent.  Germany’s Hitler demanded that 
Czechoslovakia give Germany the Sudetenland, a section of territory containing a 
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sizable population of ethnic Germans.  For most of mid-1938, the leaders of Europe’s 
democracies tried to balance defending their own interests in the face of German’s 
perceived power with the need to find a peaceful agreement due to their perceived 
weakness.  The perceived vulnerability of French and British territory to German air 
attack illustrates the perceived power imbalance.  Communiqués coming into 
Washington from Europe stressed that Germany was out-producing the combined efforts 
of Britain and France in fighters and bombers.2  American policymakers also became 
alarmed at Germany’s ability to move troops into key areas before the French and 
British could react.  Ambassador Kennedy noted that the French have “exaggerated” the 
level of coordination between themselves and the British.3  Kennedy hints that the future 
allies would be unable to coordinate a defense against the Germans. 
As Cordell Hull stated in his memoirs, Munich settled nothing.4  On the contrary, 
the agreement caused so much anxiety in the soon-to-be Allied camp that neither Britain 
nor France could determine the next move of Germany’s Fuhrer, Adolph Hitler.  
American diplomatic circles were no less affected by the rumors and intrigue that 
afflicted European governments.5  The Roosevelt administration received conflicting 
reports from Europe.  On the one hand, some stated that Hitler and other European 
powers truly sought peace.  On the other, dispatches stressed the weakness of America’s  
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friendly buffer that France and Great Britain acted as.  Without being able to affect the 
situation, Munich highlighted America’s weakness since Washington had stressed the 
need for such a conference but took no part.  This set the stage for the coming crisis. 
Yet unlike a year later, the Czech Crisis ended peacefully.  British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain was not the only official hoping that the western 
democracies had achieved “peace in our time.”  Howard Bucknell, American Consul in 
Geneva, Switzerland, cabled Washington with a message mixed with hope and caution.  
While recognizing that appeasement was the Allies only recourse, Bucknell stated that it 
appeared that the Munich agreement represented “the forerunner of an attempt on the 
part of Great Britain, France, Italy, and German progressively to settle all of the major 
causes of friction in Europe and that from now on a new era, permeated with the ‘spirit 
of Munich,’ is about to dawn.”6  Likewise, many within the American diplomatic 
community believed that Hitler was willing to risk war to achieve his goals but would 
rather gain them peacefully.  Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles reported that in 
his conversation with French Ambassador René Marquis de St. Quentin that both Britain 
and France felt Germany unable to undertake any major military operation for more than 
a year.  Welles noted that the French believed “there was an increasing apathy on the 
part of the German public towards the Nazi party” and that a harvest that was “decidedly 
less” than previous years would hamper any aggressive moves by Hitler. 7 
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Yet while many Americans hoped that Munich would represent the high point of 
British and French appeasement, American policymakers understood that the United 
States lost standing on the world stage.  While Secretary of State Hull refused to commit 
the United States to the agreement immediately because he found it undesirable, 
European leaders remembered that Roosevelt had stressed the need for just such a 
conference to resolve the tensions in Europe.8  Its apparently passive acceptance of the 
less-than-desirable Munich Agreement underscored the weak position the Roosevelt 
administration operated from as noted later by Winston Churchill.9   
While some in Washington would later lament Munich, the documents from the 
period show that the Roosevelt administration realized that America could do little else.  
Hull and others pressed Roosevelt to take a stronger stance on Hitler’s demands, but 
Hull noted that Roosevelt feared domestic political repercussions.10  The isolationists in 
Congress and the press “leaped” at any hint of participation in Europe’s affairs.11  
Dispatches from across the Atlantic asked Roosevelt and his deputies if the United States 
would send arms to support Britain and France if they chose to confront the German 
despot.  Officials including Ambassadors William C. Bullitt in France and Joseph P. 
Kennedy in Britain stressed the fact that neither nation could keep up with German  
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military preparations without American help.12  All that Roosevelt could do was send 
pleas for peace to both Hitler and Italian Duce Benito Mussolini.  Roosevelt attempted to 
remind Hitler that World War I had “failed to bring tranquility” to Europe and that its 
end was “sterile” for victor and vanquished.13  It was Roosevelt’s conviction to play to 
Hitler’s rationality and emotions at the same time. 
Willliam L. Shirer notes that Roosevelt tried to leave open the possibility of 
American action by noting that Roosevelt warned in a public address that “no one could 
predict whether or not the United States would be drawn in” if war broke out.14  Yet 
Roosevelt had to backpedal shortly afterwards by distancing the United States from the 
Franco-British alliance.15  Shirer’s correct analysis of these contradictory statements 
shows that Roosevelt could do little to shore up French and British resolve.  FDR’s 
incoherent policies instead undercut it and did nothing to bolster the Allie’s resolve.  In 
later months, questions of the resolve of both France and Britain would plague American 
policymakers all the way up to the fall of France. 
 While America’s weak stand at Munich opened the door to Allied questions of 
Roosevelt’s sincerity, the United States’ ability to influence German policy had already 
been harmed by political infighting within the administration.  Hindenburg should 
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resonate among diplomatic historians as it does with aviation historians for it had a 
major effect on U.S.-German relations.  In 1938 after the Hindenburg disaster, Germany 
asked to buy helium from the United States in order to avoid a similar occurrence.  
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes initially approved the sale, yet the loyal New 
Dealer and anti-Nazi that Attorney General Francis Biddle called as fanatic as a 
“belligerent Donald Duck” stalled and later denied the sale.16  Ickes justified his actions 
by stating that Washington had no way of verifying that the helium would not be used 
for military purposes.17  Yet in his diaries, Ickes hints at another motivation.  Ickes hated 
how Hull wanted to “handle these European dictators with gloved hands” and “rattle the 
saber when it comes to Japan.”18  Ickes used his personal relationship with FDR to 
bypass Hull.  Ickes move illustrates how many in Roosevelt’s administration would use 
their personal influence with the President to affect foreign affairs outside their domain 
in order to combat Fascism.   
Hull, however, appropriately feared that overt American condemnation would 
hurt the United States’s ability to deal with Germany and Italy. Yet having Roosevelt’s 
ear as a fellow New Dealer and better press skills, Ickes received support from Roosevelt 
and shifted the blame for the denial onto the State Department for a time until the 
controversy passed.  Hull notes that Roosevelt believed Ickes until Hull showed him 
Ickes’s request for Hull to permit the helium sale to which FDR “was much surprised.”19  
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As America’s official face in the world, the State Department came out of the 
controversy looking to be anti-German.  Ickes’s move help poison relations between 
Washington and Berlin; relations that could have helped the Allied cause.  America 
already appeared to be Germany’s enemy by early 1938 and could not claim to be a 
neutral third party at Munich or afterwards. 
 Ickes’s move also weakened the State Department internally.  Cordell Hull told 
Roosevelt that he would not act as administrator of his department.  Hull saw his role as 
advisor to the president.20  Losing the battle to Ickes weakened Hull’s standing in the 
eyes of his subordinates.  Solicitor General Francis Biddle wrote in his memoirs that 
Hull was the “old man” in Washington who slowing lost power to younger, more 
motivated individuals.21  One individual, Sumner Welles, would rise to challenge Hull 
directly because of this apparent weakness.  With Roosevelt’s advisors at each other’s 
throats, American foreign policy suffered due to infighting and separate agendas.  
 
The Beginnings of FDR’s Moral Diplomacy 
 Munich represented the beginnings of Roosevelt’s “moral diplomacy” in Europe.  
Roosevelt had used similar tactics to undercut and isolate his political opponents on 
domestic matters.  His fireside chats bypassed Congress and took Roosevelt’s arguments 
directly to the American people.  Now in foreign policy, Roosevelt appears to have 
hoped that public statements would cut through diplomatic protocol and attack the 
problem at its source. 
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As early as 1933, Washington tried to use moral condemnation of Japanese 
atrocities in China in order to bring international pressure on Tokyo.  Roosevelt hoped 
that a “moral embargo” in which the United States strongly opposed the sale of aircraft 
and parts to countries using these against civilian targets would help deny the “material 
encouragement” for the aggressors.22  These embargos had little official power and were 
informal in nature. By 1938, nonetheless, the Roosevelt administration used these 
condemnations regularly.  The lack of enforcement power did not necessarily mean that 
these tactics did not work.  Sumner Welles reported to Roosevelt that while the United 
Aircraft Corporation continued to sell aircraft components to Japan at the end of 1938, 
most other manufacturers willingly cooperated. Welles’s response to United’s obstinacy 
was to release its name and details of its sales to the American press.23   
Similarly, Roosevelt hoped to use his position as a world leader to pressure 
aggressors with threats of making them international pariahs.  On October 5, 1937, FDR 
stated that all peace-loving nations should “quarantine” those states involved in “terror 
and international lawlessness.”24  The quarantine would amount to economic and 
political sanctions.  Again, Roosevelt appears to have tried to give Germany, Italy, and 
Japan an incentive to act in accordance with international law and tradition. 
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Nevertheless, Congress had the sole ability to levy sanctions.  Roosevelt, thus, 
tried to bluff those he saw as aggressors.  The French, on the other hand, took the 
President at his word.  As John Haight has pointed out, France paid special attention to  
Roosevelt’s quarantine speech and other moral pronouncements.  Haight notes that then-
Premier Camille Chautemps considered FDR the world’s spokesman for democracy and 
law because of the quarantine speech.  This view would transform later into the view of 
Roosevelt as moral enforcer.25    
Besides trying to use his position as an international moral guide, Roosevelt 
acted as preacher to the masses.  Two days before Germany, France, and Britain signed 
the final draft of the Munich agreement, Roosevelt sent a personal plea to Hitler and 
Mussolini.  In it, Roosevelt repeated his wish to maintain order in the international 
realm.  He justified his stance, however, by trying to tap the two dictators sense of public 
responsibility as if Hitler and Mussolini were accountable to their respective populace in 
the same manner as an obstinate congressman was.  In the letter, Roosevelt said that if 
world leaders did not look for all avenues to peace, “the souls of every man, woman, and 
child whose lives will be lost will hold [them] accountable.”26        
 
The Aftereffects of the First World War.    
 As 1939 dawned, an earlier war still affected how America dealt with the 
impending crisis.  Even before the dust of German armored convoys moving into 
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Czechoslovakia had settled, the French asked the United States about the possibility of 
buying war supplies.  Aircraft topped the French list from the very beginning.27  The 
New York Times reported that French aviation experts came to the United States to study 
American aircraft production techniques and methods.28  The French wanted more than 
advice, however.  They needed America’s industrial base to produce war material for 
them. 
Yet the French could not buy the requested supplies nor gain credit for doing so 
because of the Johnson Act passed after World War I.  The act represented the same 
sentiment behind the Nye commission’s findings that war profiteers had pushed America 
into the Great War by tying the United States to the French and British economically.29  
The Johnson Act stated that countries owing the United States an outstanding debt would 
be limited in the amount of military supplies and credit it could purchase even with 
approval from Washington.  Combined with the revised Neutrality Act, which forced 
countries to seek approval from the U.S. government before buying armaments, this 
limitation extended to rather ordinary items that could be considered war supplies.  
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Cotton, for example, fell under these restrictions as tension grew in 1939 as the 
Neutrality Laws began to take effect.  Despite this, French officials continued to ask for 
aid and concerned themselves especially with aircraft. 
Dispatches between the capitals illustrate how Roosevelt’s friend, Ambassador 
Bullitt, worked with Daladier and Reynaud to find a way to settle France’s debt and give 
the French access to American-produced aircraft.30  Bullitt suggested that private banks 
could extend credit, even while technically forbidden by the Johnson Act, because the 
act had never passed judicial review.  Bullitt recognized, nonetheless, the need to pay off 
the debt.  He stressed to the French that Congress would not accept a “token payment.”  
With France owing 87 billion francs, French Minister of Finance Paul Reynaud 
suggested to Bullitt that France could pay 10 billion plus trade the United States French 
possessions in the Caribbean and Pacific to relieve France of the Johnson Act 
restrictions.31  Daladier rejected this and stressed the need for French exports.  Bullitt 
also relayed a request that Roosevelt seek tariff reductions.  The French found it hard to 
pay debts to the United States when American tariffs made French products too 
expensive for average Americans to buy.32   
Tensions in the Pacific added to those in Europe.  Bullitt reported that the French 
feared that any action in Europe would divert attention away from French Indochina.  
With France not able to come to their colony’s aid, the weakness of the French could 
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give the Japanese incentive to take the area by force.  Bullitt informed Roosevelt that the 
French planned to buy aircraft through the Emperor of Annam in order to circumvent the 
Congressional barrier.  In a memo dated February 23, 1939, Bullitt gave tacit 
endorsement to this course of action.33 
Dispatches and documents clearly show that Roosevelt knew and facilitated these 
cloak and dagger methods.  While Roosevelt used the bully pulpit to keep American 
companies from selling to America’s possible enemies, he skirted the law trying to 
provide the same to the French and British.  Roosevelt asked Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to allow Canada to request loans from the United States.  The 
Canadians would use these loans to build aircraft factories.  In turn, the plants would 
produce aircraft destined for the French air force.34   
The head of the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee (see footnote), Jean Monnet 
relates an episode that while meeting with the President, Roosevelt drew a map for 
Monnet showing where he want to place these factories on the North-East frontier as to 
have access to American-made components.35  In addition to building plants in Canada, 
the French proposed through Ambassador Bullitt that the French create the Amiot 
Company and locate it in the United States.  Being a company in which the French 
government held stock yet within the United States, the firm would be exempt from 
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many of the Neutrality Act’s restrictions.  Thus, the company could build military 
aircraft for the French.36 
While Roosevelt skirted Congressional oversight, he justified his support for 
direct sales to the American public.  During press conferences, Roosevelt stressed the 
domestic benefits of helping France.  French orders would stimulate economic growth 
and employ American workers.  According to FDR, “most of the aircraft factories in this 
country are, today, idle” and that the French orders would prepare the production base 
for forthcoming American orders.37  Roosevelt argued that the Great Depression had 
created a bottleneck in critical industries essential for both domestic and defense needs.  
The French orders were relatively small and would not alter the balance of power.  They 
would provide France with the means to defend itself and allow factories to turn out 
American aircraft more efficiently once Roosevelt’s defense appropriations bill cleared 
Congress and American orders had to be filled.38 
Yet those in Washington realized that the Neutrality Acts represented a major 
hurdle.  Bullitt reported from Paris that the Daladier government put its bets up front and 
hoped that the law would be amended.  Daladier was “absolutely determined” to get as 
many airplanes and components from the United States as he could.39  This even meant 
making orders that clearly violated the Neutrality Act hoping Congress would change it 
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before war came.  The question of war supplies, especially aircraft, would continue to 
haunt the Roosevelt administration in the months to follow and reveal how misinformed 
the government was about what was going on in Europe until France collapsed.  If 
Washington had been better informed, policymakers would see that France’s weakness 
lay with its government, not just its military. 
 
Who Wants War? 
 At the beginning of 1939, it appeared that Austria and Czechoslovakia had 
satisfied Hitler’s call for lebensraum.  French minister Bonnet believed that 
consolidating his recent victories occupied Hitler, but that Italy had not benefited from 
Germany’s demands.  Bullitt reported to Washington that German Foreign Minister 
Ribbentrop assured him that, while Hitler wanted peace, he feared that Mussollini would 
pull Germany into conflict with Britain and France.40  Bullitt relayed French fears that 
Italy’s “bad boy” would make unacceptable demands on France after Spain’s Francisco 
Franco finished shoring up his position on the Iberian Peninsula.  According to Bullitt’s 
contacts, Germany could not avoid coming to Italy’s aid and that the crisis demanded 
action on the part of the United States.41  
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 Yet later historians have shown that Hitler had the ball and not Italy.  Hitler 
could have stopped his smaller partner at any time.  As Langer and Gleason point out, 
Hitler used Mussolini’s advice when it suited him and allowed Italy to act only when it 
benefited Germany.42 In this manner, Italy’s aggressive action took attention away from 
what Hitler had planned next.  Using Italy as a proxy also allowed Germany to drive a 
wedge between its rivals.  According to the French, Chamberlain gave the Italians the 
wrong impression during a visit to Rome in January of 1939.  American Ambassador 
William Phillips said that Chamberlain possibly gave the impression of weakness and 
“that the Italians, always quick on the trigger, may decide to take advantage in their 
relations with France.”43   
The tensions with Italy greatly affected Anglo-French relations.  Bullitt reported 
that the French feared that Chamberlain would sell the French out in order to protect 
British interests in the Middle East.44  French Prime Minister Edward Daladier 
commented to Bullitt that Chamberlain was “a desiccated stick; the king a moron; and 
the queen an excessively ambitious woman who would sacrifice every other country in 
the world in order to remain Queen Elizabeth of England.”45  Even before war broke out, 
the Allies began to come apart. 
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American officials, likewise, questioned British resolve.  Bullitt pointed out that 
German officials, such as German Air Marshal Hermann Goering, joked that Britain was 
a “rouged old maid trying to pretend that she was still young and vigorous and capable 
of being a partner to anyone.”46  Clearly, Goering hoped to draw France under German 
influence.  Winston Churchill recognized the fact that Germany tried to divide the allies 
before the war broke out.47 Yet Goering’s statement did not represent a minority opinion.  
In turn, while Churchill condemned France for its acceptance of Czechoslovakia’s fate 
and stated that he knew the British people were willing to fight, many in Roosevelt’s 
inner circle worried more about Britain’s ability to act as partner to France.48  
Ambassador to Britain Joseph Kennedy cabled Roosevelt complaining about 
Chamberlain’s government to inability to make a stand.   
While those, like Biddle, considered Kennedy a naive appeaser, Kennedy’s 
assessment reflected the general mood between Bullitt and others.49  Daladier considered 
Britain a “weak reed on which to lean.”50  This common perception explains why France 
looked toward the United States for support materially and morally instead of its ally.  
Similarly, Roosevelt and his advisors conceived France as the dominant partner of the 
alliance from the start.  American policy increasingly centered on France as America’s 
shield.  Due to this, Ambassador Bullitt became the leading authority on European 
matters and was looked to, by Roosevelt, almost exclusively.51  
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While Britain worried about the Italian Navy, French relations with Italy 
centered on the Spanish civil war and its aftermath.  Just prior to the Munich conference, 
France intended to help the remnants of the Republican forces.  American officials 
thought this to be a lost cause and France had waited too long for its aid to matter.  No 
material aid could help the Spanish.  Only the introduction of French troops could alter 
the situation.  The final defeat of Republican forces also worried those in Washington 
that Spain could serve as a base for fascist inroads into South America.  Republican 
General Jose Miaja also told Harold Ickes that he felt that Franco’s success in Spain in 
spite of French aid would signal weakness of French resolve and spur the Germans to 
attack west rather than east.52   
The Spanish situation had an additional effect on French politics as well.  French 
Socialists began pushing the Daladier government to “reinvigorate” a Franco-Soviet 
alliance.  Rightist elements joined this push and stressed the importance of a Polish 
alliance in hemming in the fascist countries.53  It seems ironic that in just over a year, 
American officials would be involved in a similar debate. 
 
Bullitt 
Langer and Gleason argue that Franklin Roosevelt waited too long in recognizing 
the dangers posed by Germany and Italy to Europe.  For these historians, men such as 
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William C. Bullitt charted the course for the country.54  Yet these and later historians 
forget that Bullitt was a product and follower of Roosevelt.  At first glance, William C. 
Bullitt appears the perfect choice for Ambassador to France at this period.  Bullitt had 
the background of a New Dealer and a close relationship with President Roosevelt.  
Roosevelt appointed Bullitt to his post in Paris in 1936 after Bullitt left his post as the 
first American ambassador to the Soviet Union.   
Being the picture of a 1930’s socialite, Bullitt quickly made contacts within the 
upper circles of the French government.  In Paris, Bullitt’s talents made him appear to be 
the best diplomat in Europe.  George Kennan called Bullitt “debonair, financially 
independent, and lacking any ties other than duty.”55  Assistant Ambassador Robert 
Murphy noted that Bullitt’s abilities allowed him to get closer to French politics or its 
leadership than any other American diplomat before him.56  In her biography of Bullitt, 
Beatrice Farnsworth called Bullitt the “diplomat without a portfolio” indicating he 
needed no credentials in Paris.  He was a close friend of Daladier and held many 
informal lunches with top French officials.  The contents of these gossip sessions 
reached Roosevelt during his almost nightly phone conversations with Bullitt.  Because 
of his contacts in Paris and Washington, Bullitt became the channel and filter through 
which Roosevelt received much of his information.57 
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 The perception of close contacts led most in Washington to use Bullitt’s 
assessment as a base point when talking about European matters.  Bullitt, like Sumner 
Welles, came from the same background as Roosevelt and had what Stephen  
Weatherford calls a perfect basis for an “interpersonal network” with the President.58  In 
the memoirs of both Harold Ickes and Adolph Bearle, the views of other ambassadors, 
such as Joseph Kennedy, had to pass a “bullitt” test.  As illustrated in these sources, 
Bullitt is quoted more often than many ambassadors combined.  Bullitt’s omnipresence 
comes from both his position as ambassador and his social standing.  State Department 
dispatches illustrate Bullitt’s almost nightly reports that had a propensity for length and 
stepping into the arena of policy making.59  He advised the president on what courses of 
action seemed most beneficial in light of his understanding of events. 
 Roosevelt recognized Bullitt’s ability to glean information from top French 
officials.  Roosevelt trusted Bullitt, loyal to Roosevelt and faithful New Dealer, and he 
communicated directly with the ambassador to the exclusion of normal State Department 
channels.  Joseph Kennedy and Sumner Welles enjoyed similar close relations with the 
President.  Cordell Hull noted that this direct and informal network often left him and his 
                                                 
     58 M. Stephen Weatherford,  “Interpersonal Networks and Political Behavior,” American Journal of 
Political Science 26, no. 1 (February 1982): 117-143. 
Weatherford argues that an advisor’s background and social similarities can make their advice seem more 
credible to a decision maker since each has a foundation for understanding.  They speak the same language 
and have similar experiences. 
     59Many of these conversations were never transcribed.  They are alluded to in many state department 
dispatches and personal letters between Bullitt and Roosevelt.  In many of the dispatches, now held at the 
FDR Presidential Library, Roosevelt asks other advisors to speak with him on the subject of the dispatch.  
These conversations will never be known.  
 41
department guessing what was going on.60  This would help contribute to the break down 
of America’s foreign policy establishment as the European crisis developed. 
 Despite Bullitt’s talents, he had the tendency to become too personally involved 
in the politics of his host country.  George Kennan remarked in his memoirs that Bullitt 
took every slight and frustration as a personal insult.  He was quick to send information 
back to Washington, and even before arriving in Paris, showed a clear lack of analytical 
ability.  This quickness to reach a conclusion on superficial level would handicap 
American policy towards France in the war to come.61 
  
Where Is America? 
 While Washington tried to gather as much information as to the emerging crisis, 
many in France began asking this question.  Concern in Paris shifted from Italy to 
Germany in the late spring of 1939.  After stressing his desire for peace, Hitler marched 
his German armies into the rest of Czechoslovakia.  Hitler justified his move by claiming 
that Germany needed the raw materials that “Jews, democracies, and the ‘international 
powers’” had historically denied Germany.62  What alarmed American leaders was 
Hitler’s overall plan.  After crushing Poland, Germany would “settle accounts with her 
hereditary enemy: France” and “obliterate [it] from the map of Europe.”  Finally, 
Germany would use the possessions of her vanquished foes to attack the Dollarjuden 
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(Jews of the dollar) in the United States.63  While not becoming a pertinent issue yet, the 
assets of the Allies would jump onto Washington’s front burner as things began to go 
badly for the Allies. 
 This saber rattling did not go unnoticed in Paris.  With what appeared as Hitler 
openly planning to attack the United States, some in Paris felt that Washington wanted to 
use French and British troops as cannon fodder to buy time in order to make a deal with 
Germany.  A movement for appeasement, led by former French Prime Minister Pierre-
Etenne Flandin, began to build momentum.  In a June 24 issue of SOIR, Flandin voiced 
what many would begin to think as war broke.  While Roosevelt’s moral preachings had 
a positive effect inside the United States, the lack of American action made the United 
States appear hypocritical.  Flandin criticized Roosevelt’s admonishments “to be 
energetic, to be firm in the face of violent enterprise” while America sat on its hands.64  
  
Instead of Daladier’s belief of America coming to Europe’s aid, Flandin argued 
that the United States would remain indifferent while “war risks steeping Europe in 
blood.” In Germany, Hitler compared Roosevelt to Wilson as a warmonger that wants to 
be seen as a peacemaker.65  Bullitt voiced American concerns that America would 
become a scapegoat for a second Munich.  Rumors of a deal at the expense of Eastern 
Europe filtered back to Washington.  Yet there appears no evidence that Bullitt or 
Roosevelt understood that some in Europe questioned American resolve.  But with the 
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United States not stepping in as guarantor of Europe’s freedom, France and Britain 
looked to the other side of the continent for support.  As an Allied-Soviet alliance 
became a possibility, American policymakers made the mistake that America could 
remain both aloof and part of the unfolding crisis.66  Roosevelt appears to have felt that 
the key to containing Germany lay in keeping the smaller states of Europe free of 
German influence being backed up morally by a larger power.67  Yet American politics 
would not allow the United States to fill this role fully.  
 
Russia Rather than the United States  
The foreign policy of the United States can best be described in early 1939 as 
awaiting the outcome on the sidelines, but openly showing support for France and 
Britain with the hopes of using American diplomacy to bring Russia to the same 
decision.68   During the tumultuous months of the summer of 1939, Soviet assistance in 
bottling up the German threat became an important issue in American European policy.  
Beginning in March, the Anglo-French alliance began negotiations with the Soviets.  Yet 
the cables clearly show that the Russians made too many demands.  How each side of 
the Anglo-French alliance handled these demands created further cleavages within this 
alliance, which was never strong to begin with.  Due to this, Roosevelt’s advisors tried to 
act as mediators between the two.  Daladier complained to Ambassador Bullitt that the 
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British “were falling over themselves to accede to the Russian demands” that France 
could not accept.69   
The British, nonetheless, viewed the situation differently.  Kennedy reported that 
after speaking with Lord Halifax on the matter, that he felt that the time had passed for 
getting the Soviets to agree to any sort of alliance even when others in Roosevelt’s inner 
circle believed British resolve was stiffening.70  Adolf Berle shared Kennedy’s beliefs 
and wrote in his diary that by summer, any hope for Russia picking up the lion’s share of 
containing Germany had passed.71 
Yet the French still held out hope.  Ambassador Bullitt shared this belief but 
advocated that Washington continue to act on French behalf to lessen Soviet influence 
on France.  He reiterated, however, the need for American aid to the French.  After 
serving as ambassador to the Soviet Union, Bullitt did not trust Stalin.  He believed that 
the Soviets had broken their word by not paying Russia’s debt from World War I and 
stressed that America could not trust any Russian promises. 72  He had left his post in 
Moscow under duress, being criticized by the Soviet press and used in as a straw man in 
Soviet propaganda.   
As in Paris, Bullitt took diplomacy as a personal matter.  When the Soviets 
reneged on promises, he took this as a personal insult and outwardly showed it.73  While 
not mentioned in the State Department documents, Farnsworth argues that Bullitt’s 
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history with the Soviets may have poisoned any chances at a Franco-Soviet 
understanding.  Bullitt opposed any military alliance and actively worked against loans 
and aid from France to the Soviet Union.74  While Bullitt agreed with Daladier that 
Soviet animosity was needed to contain Hitler, he wanted France to have no part of a 
formal alliance with Russia.   
However, American domestic politics prohibited any more direct involvement.  
The United States had to help sway the Soviet giant.  In doing so, Soviet intrigue would 
hurt American foreign policy and add to the confusing signals sent by Washington to the 
French.  America, again, would send mixed signals as the Roosevelt administration tried 
to rally the Soviets but keep them separated from the Allies. 
As the summer of 1939 ended, the French could neither depend on America for 
help nor go it alone.  The, with the British, would look towards the Soviets for help, but 
continue to ask Washington for aid.  How Roosevelt and his advisors reacted would only 
confound the Allies more and make American foreign policy efforts that much harder. 
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CHAPTER III   
AMERICA’S PHONEY WAR, 
JULY 1939-FEBRUARY 1940 
 
 As summer rolled into fall, Roosevelt placed America as a supporting cast 
member behind the French before the curtain rose on the final crisis of the 1930’s.  
Nonetheless, many in France continued to question how far America would go in 
helping the Allies.  Would Roosevelt send aid in large quantities from across the 
Atlantic?  Would American troops come to the aid of France if the Germans 
overpowered them?  While the answers to these questions remained unclear, France 
appeared to those in Washington as able to bear the initial brunt of war.  Their 
perception was wrong.  Roosevelt and those around him based it on information from the 
advisors Roosevelt had placed in key positions and this forced his administration to rely 
upon them. 
 For Roosevelt, the coming months would be a delicate balance of carrot and 
stick.  Before the sitzkreig ended, Roosevelt appears to have hoped that Germany might 
have sought an honorable, negotiated peace if America acted as aloof mediator.  To this 
end, Sumner Welles would travel to Europe with Roosevelt’s plan for peace.  The 
Welles mission would represent yet another example of mixed signals, as Welles’s 
statements promoting peace abroad did not coincide with statements by other American 
diplomats. These mixed signals confused both friend and foe alike and reinforced the 
doubts of American resolve.  France and Britain cannot be blamed for questioning 
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American policy since America seemed unprepared to enter European politics and back 
up its rhetoric with firm action or troops. 
On the other hand, Washington continued to browbeat Germany with moral 
diplomacy and send signals that America backed France fully.  Ambassador Bullitt 
continued to try to stiffen the French resolve.  Nonetheless, Roosevelt’s administration 
was divided.  Bullitt, Cordell Hull, and Welles continued to operate with seemingly 
divergent goals.  Bullitt sought to aid France at all costs, while Welles sought peace at 
all costs.  Hull tried to walk the fine line between maintaining order abroad and 
preparing for the chaos of war.  Hull’s health would complicate matters as the Secretary 
abdicated his role to his deputy, Sumner Welles. The rise of Welles to international 
status would, in hindsight, trigger a battle for control of the State Department and 
American foreign policy.  
 American leaders hoped that they could entice Russia to shoulder the increasing 
load.  During this period, prospects for a Franco-Soviet settlement seemed good to some, 
a wasted effort for others.  Both the Americans and the French knew that the possibility 
of a two-front war would deter Hitler far more than increased military budgets and tough 
talk.  Solidarity and unity of action on the part of the Allies and Russia would save 
Europe from German aggression.  Nevertheless, American policymakers pursued this 
with an inconsistent, incoherent foreign policy.  
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U.S.-Russian Policy 
 If Roosevelt’s support for France gained only marginal sympathy in the United 
States, diplomacy with Russia amounted to the impossible.  By June of 1939, signs of 
Russian espionage and other subversive work were common knowledge to Roosevelt’s 
inner circle.  In the early 1930’s, Russia attempted to counterfeit American currency in 
order to fund the Soviet economy and disrupt the capitalist states.  Two underground 
“centers” operated in the United States. One involved infiltrating American labor unions 
while the other acted as a military intelligence branch.1  With Soviet intrigue already at 
work within the United States, Washington had little incentive to work with the USSR. 2 
 Yet with Ambassador Bullitt stressing the French need to have a stronger ally 
than Britain (namely the United States), American policymakers hoped that they could 
broker a deal.  This became all more important with news that the Soviets had 
commenced economic negotiations with the Germans which they had denied just weeks 
before.  The race was on to see who received Soviet support.  The French told Bullitt 
that they felt that the German negotiations were a way Stalin could pressure the West to 
concede to his demands in the Balkans, the Baltic States, and in the East.3  Stalin would 
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never side with a country whose sole ideology rested on the elimination of communists 
and Jews.  However, Daladier remained pessimistic about preserving peace. 
 While joking that he was psychic in a memo to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf 
Berle, Roosevelt stated that believed that war was inevitable by September 10 if French-
British-Soviet negotiations did not pan out.4  To this end, Roosevelt ordered Sumner 
Welles (who was Acting Secretary of State) to order Ambassador Lawrence Steinhardt 
to express that it was in both the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union that 
peace remain intact in Europe.  Welles instructed Steinhardt to stress the economic and 
political benefits of a French-British-Soviet alliance as this could help bring the Soviet 
Union into the brotherhood of nations.5  Although the negotiations between the Soviets 
and the West bogged down in late spring, Ambassador to Belgium Joseph E. Davies 
cabled Hull and Roosevelt in Washington that he believed that he “could be helpful 
either in turning the scales in Russia’s decision or aiding to strengthen it, and 
consequently implement in a small way your great effort for world peace.”6  
Nonetheless, Bullitt’s fears appeared justified as Steinhardt reported that he 
believed Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov bargained for time as they had  
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informed neither the French nor the British of their talks with Germany.7  At the time, 
those in Washington did not know if the Soviets hoped to garner more concessions from 
the Allies (especially the French) or used this as a stick in the just discovered German-
Soviet economic negotiations. 
    By August 1939, it became clear that the Soviets were stalling for time. Yet as 
Bullitt reported, the French could not envison a Russo-German pact.  What worried the 
Daladier government was the fear that an economic agreement between Germany and 
the Soviet Union would destroy the incentives for a pact between the French and the 
Soviets.  In a 1948 Life magazine article, Bullitt claimed that the United States 
government  
 
was so fully informed with regard to relations between Stalin and 
Hitler [that] without the expenditure of one cent for spies and agents, 
American diplomatic representatives had been able to inform President 
Roosevelt as early as the autumn of 1934 that the Soviet dictator  
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wanted an agreement with the Nazi dictator and that Hitler  could have 
a pact with Stalin whenever he might wish to have one.8 
 
Bullitt goes on to claim that  
 
both the French and British governments were warned by us that Stalin 
was using his negotiations with them for a pact against Hitler merely as 
a screen behind which to prepare a pact with Hitler.  They found our 
warning to difficult to believe…..but President Roosevelt knew the pact 
was coming and that it would produce war.9 
 
Bullitt’s actions, however, do not support Bullitt’s latter claims.  The American 
government tried to act on the French behalf with the Soviets while Ambassador Bullitt 
tried to stop it, not because he knew of a Soviet-German pact, but because he feared a 
Soviet-French pact would put French interests in peril and draw France closer to a 
totalitarian state he despised. 
 To this end, Bullitt kept Washington informed of developments late in the 
summer.  While trying to delay a Franco-Soviet pact, Bullitt acted on the behalf of the 
Polish ambassador to France dealing with Poland’s problems with Russia. One of the  
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Soviet demands was access to Germany through Poland in the case of war.  Bullitt 
believed that the Soviets would use any excuse to send troops into Polish territory.10 The 
fact that Moscow demanded the right to enter any Baltic state whose government 
changed in favor of an aggressor (Germany) worried Bullitt and those in Washington.11  
Stalin could use any excuse to invade Poland, yet the Soviet dictator placed this right as 
a top priority in the Franco-Soviet negotiations.   
Nonetheless, a Soviet alliance with the Allies appeared to have benefits.  As late 
as July 27, Bullitt reported that Turkey might join the Allied cause.  According to the  
ambassador, they would not have done this unless they had received signals from 
Moscow that Stalin would sign a Soviet-French pact.12  Despite the contradictory 
messages sent by both Roosevelt’s pro-Soviet policy and Bullitt’s seemingly staunch 
stance against such a policy, both French and British governments believed an 
agreement highly possible by August.  Daladier gave the likelihood of success a “eighty 
times out of one hundred” chance and hoped such a pact would cool Hitler’s enthusiasm 
for a next move.13  
 
The Polish and Danzig Questions 
 The French and British appear to have believed that American diplomacy on 
their behalf would lead to boxing Hitler in and providing a way to support Poland.  In 
mid July, British Chamberlain’s acceptance for supporting for Poland signaled a 
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stiffening of British resolve.  A negotiated peace remained possible, but the Allies felt 
that Poland could now be openly supported as a deterrent to Hitler’s ambitions.14  War 
seemed imminent anyway since reports flowed into Paris indicating that Hitler was 
preparing to act against the Poles over the question of Danzig.  While the French and 
British tried to negotiate with Stalin, Hitler raised the question of a disunited German 
people as he did over Czechoslovakia. 
 The free port of Danzig lay between Germany and East Prussia.  Hitler argued 
that this left Germanic peoples under the control of Poles and that these Germans were 
being discriminated against.  Hitler began organizing SA and SS units around Danzig in 
German controlled areas while ostensibly opening talks to resolve the issue.  While the 
French applauded the restraint of the Poles when dealing with small attacks by Germans, 
they grew weary of Polish delay at the bargaining table and feared that Russia would 
betray the Allies.15  American officials could not decide whether Hitler truly intended to 
use “extreme means” or if the crisis developing over Danzig was a Germany 
“deliberately inspiring apprehension in France and in England hoping once again to win 
its way through a final test of nerves.”  In some ways, the constant stream of crises in the 
late 30’s had left many in Roosevelt’s inner circle calloused and thus blind to the fact 
that war loomed large on the horizon.16 
 
                                                 
     14 “Gray to Secretary of State, July 11, 1939,” file 740.00/1900, RG 59, National Archives. 
     15 “Bullitt to Secretary of State, July 27, 1939,” file 740.00/1955, RG 59, National Archives; “Gray to 
Secretary of State, July 11, 1929,” file 740.00/1900, RG 59, National Archives. 
     16 “Bullitt to Secretary of State, July 27, 1939,” file 740.00/1955, RG 59, National Archives; “Bullitt to 
Secretary of State, August 5, 1939,” file 740.00/2013, RG 59, National Archives. 
  
54
 
The August Crisis    
 Information Ambassador Bullitt acquired indicated that the heretofore 
unsuccessful Soviet negotiations acted as a basis for Hitler’s demands against Poland 
over Danzig.  The German dictator railed against encirclement at England’s hands.17  
The Polish Ambassador to the United States told Sumner Welles that Polish leaders did 
not expect Hitler to go to war over Danzig and thanked the French, British, and 
American governments for their efforts on Poland’s behalf.18  However, Hitler continued 
to demand the right to annex the Polish Corridor and by mid-August appeared ready to 
“break loose” in an attempt to gain it.19  After the war, Congressman Hamilton Fish who 
as an outspoken critic of Roosevelt argued that Britain should not have assured Poland’s 
independence and thus precipitated war in the West. Fish pointed out that Bullitt’s 
urging of the French not to negotiate hardened both sides.20  With this attitude already in 
mind, Congressman Fish traveled to Europe as president of the congressional group to 
the Interparliamentary Union at the Oslo Conference.  Fish’s vocal dissent caused an 
uproar in the Paris newspapers as editorials asked where America stood on the Danzig 
question.  Many Parisians wondered if American congressional leaders had been 
“hooked” like a fish by German propaganda.21 
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 Nonetheless, Fish’s Oslo proposal of a thirty-day truce to settle the question over 
Danzig represents a failure on Roosevelt’s part to consult congressional leaders and, in 
the least, keep American policy consistent.  Fish’s proposal opposed the administration’s 
stated goals of containing Germany within a wall of friendly nations.  Fish might have 
been right that Roosevelt let his ego get in the way and thus underrated the role and 
power of Congress.22  During Fish’s tour of Europe, Roosevelt demanded that he be 
under the constant eye of his favorite proxies.  In one memo, FDR jokingly asks how the 
administration could “legally get rid of Mr. Fish.”23  Whatever the reason, the 
contradictory messages sent by the president on the one hand and Congress on the other 
only left those in the Daladier government asking who truly spoke for the United States. 
 As historian William Henry Chamberlain observed, the announcement of the 
Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact on August 22, sounded like a “crack of doom” for 
the chances for Poland’s survival.24  Yet this crack of doom heralded the beginning of 
the end of both the Third Republic and the Roosevelt’s foreign policy of peace.  
American foreign policy had been based on France as buffer against Germany 
aggression.  As Count Ciano of Italy observed: 
 
Can France and Britain, who have based all other anti-Axis policy on an 
alliance with the Soviets, count upon the unconditional support of the  
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extremist masses?  And will the system of encirclement by means of 
small states continue to prevail now that the Moscow balance has 
collapsed?25   
 
For the Roosevelt administration, it meant that foreign policy could no longer be done on 
the cheap.  Up until this point, Roosevelt had discouraged American companies from 
dealing in hotspots around the globe hoping to maintain the semblance of neutrality in 
order to pacify Congress.  Roosevelt placed his hopes in the strength of the French and 
British to protect the territories within or near their colonies.  When Roosevelt received 
word that the small African nation of Liberia faced Nazi-supported subversion, he 
postponed any direct help.  The Colt Firearms Company told the State Department that it 
had rifles, pistols, and machineguns ready to ship with the necessary spare parts and 
ammunition, yet the Roosevelt denied the sale.  The basis of Roosevelt’s denial rested on 
his belief that the British Navy and French North Africa would prevent any real 
problems by keeping Germany out of Liberia.26  This particular example illustrates 
Roosevelt’s overall belief that France could act as America’s buffer since French North 
Africa lay between Germany and Liberia.   
With the Nazi-Soviet Pact, France’s confidence in its ability to protect its own 
possessions upset this belief.  Bullitt relayed from Paris that Daladier’s mood reflected 
the decline in France’s abilities to protect territories abroad as the French planned to take 
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the brunt of the attack at home.27  Gone were the steadfast assurances of French morale 
and an impregnable defense that Daladier originally promised Bullitt.28  With the pact, 
war on French soil again became all but a certainty.  Poland seemed lost, yet the French  
leader refused to entertain the idea that France should forsake Poland.  France had made 
a commitment.  It was Daladier’s firm belief that letting Poland fall without support 
would be worse for France than fighting an unwinable war.29  Yet the pact also made 
Italian action in the Mediterranean region seem certain as well.  Now France had to 
worry about a two-front war.   
 
More Moral Diplomacy 
 President Roosevelt continued to try to tap into the spirit of humanity of world 
leaders, especially the aggressors like Germany and Italy.  In the middle of August 1939, 
Roosevelt sent letters to Coronal Beck of Poland, Hitler, Mussolini, and King Victor 
Emmanuel of Italy.  Roosevelt offered his services as “impartial arbiter” for “in the 
name of peace-loving men and women everywhere, to agree to a solution of the 
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controversies.”30  Roosevelt also sent a separate letter to Hitler asking in the name of the 
German people not to go to war.31 
 Later in December of that year, Roosevelt hoped to shape politics with religious 
morality.  In a letter to Pope Pius XII, Roosevelt asked the Pontiff to use his moral 
authority to quell the tensions in Europe.  Roosevelt hoped to bypass the belligerents’ 
leaders and take his case directly to the people via the Pope.32  In this manner, Roosevelt 
wanted to duplicate the effect his fireside chats had on domestic politics.  The major 
problem Roosevelt forgot was that he was dealing with totalitarian and authoritarian 
regimes.  There, public opinion had little effect on foreign policy in the same way public 
opinion helped the New Deal succeed.  The pleas for peace only emboldened the 
aggressors and confused America’s allies.  
 
Bullitt in Wartime France 
 The initial success of the Germans in Poland alarmed those in Washington.  
Ambassador Bullitt was the first to alert the President and his other advisors by 
telephone that war had officially been declared.33  In the discussions of how to respond, 
Bullitt played a key role.  One issue that Bullitt cleared will Hull was the issuance of a 
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plea against bombing civilian targets.34  This type of action fit with Roosevelt’s moral 
diplomacy of trying to make Germany and Italy look as bad as possible internationally.  
However, this would conflict with later actions to try to deal with all sides taken on the 
part of the administration.   
A second action undertaken was the evacuation of American nationals from the 
war zone.  The panic officials felt was illustrated by the fact that all American nationals 
had already been sent to channel ports ready to leave the continent by September 8.35  
After Poland’s quick defeat, the question of supplies also became tantamount in the 
communiqués between Washington and Paris.  Bullitt wrote Roosevelt “if the Neutrality 
Act remains in its present form, France and England will be defeated rapidly”36  
By this time, Roosevelt had already began pressuring Congress to revise the 
Neutrality Acts.  On September 5, Roosevelt issued two neutrality statements.  One 
concerned international law while the other stated America’s obligations under the 
Neutrality Acts.  While the two appeared different statements, the former purposely 
stated that, under international law, the United States had no obligation to embargo the 
sales of munitions.  This rested with the Neutrality Act.  In this manner, Roosevelt 
shifted blame over to Congress and put the spotlight on their upcoming actions to revise 
this law.37  By the end of September, Roosevelt directly asked Congress to repeal the 
arms embargo.38     
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For the remainder of 1939, the quiet on the Western Front allayed fears of a 
quick German victory.  Nonetheless, Bullitt continued to reinforce the need for planes 
and other supplies by the French.  According to Bullitt, the Germans produced more 
planes per month than the two Allied nations combined.39  Stressing this, Bullitt hoped 
to spur American efforts to send more aircraft and munitions.  Yet Bullitt asked the 
impossible.  Jean Monnet, who headed the combined Allied purchasing committee, 
observed that American industry in 1939 would have difficulty quickly supplying both 
Roosevelt’s rearmament program and early French orders let alone any further French 
orders.40  Yet Roosevelt instructed Bullitt to tell Daladier “the government here will give 
every facility to the export of all types of American products.”41   
Along with the perceived need for aircraft, Bullitt relayed the revived French 
fears that the British would refuse to fight.  “The British have almost nothing in the way 
of pursuit planes in France,” reported Bullitt.  Chamberlain, and later Churchill, claimed 
that the possible invasion of the Low Countries would threaten lower Britain and saw no 
need to shift forces to France.  Yet this gave the appearance of subterfuge and 
strengthened fears that Britain could still seek a separate peace with Germany.42  
Even with French capabilities in question, Bullitt assured the president and the 
public that France could win the war with American aid.  Bullitt continued to stress the 
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French resolve to hold out against anything the Germans could launch against them.43  
According to Bullitt, the morale of the French was “absolutely magnificent.”44  The 
reports flowing from France even indicated that the French had shaken off the initial 
shock and were willing to widen the war.  Beyond their own war, Daladier suggested 
that it was France’s responsibility to help the Finns against the Soviets in the Russo-
Finnish War.45  Later events would show this was out of the question.   
Yet while many saw Bullitt’s contradictory nature as a man unable to analyze the 
events taking place around him, Bullitt’s flamboyant and social jet-setting set him in 
good stead with Roosevelt. FDR became a victim of Bullitt’s social success.  Treasury 
Secretary Morgenthau noted that Bullitt might send a dispatch in the morning reporting, 
“everything is lovely” while then send a cable in the afternoon stating that everything in 
France was “going to hell.”46  The confusing nature of the information coming in to 
Washington must have had an impact on the contradictory statements issued from 
Washington.  With the truth unclear, France would fight for its very existence in just a 
few short months.  Before this happened, Roosevelt placed his hopes in one last chance 
for peace, a risky chance that only further confused the Allies and helped wreck the 
American foreign policy establishment. 
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The Welles Mission    
 In January 1940, President Roosevelt decided to send Under-Secretary of State 
Sumner Welles on a mission to Europe in a last ditch effort at peace.  This was 
ostensibly a “step which [Roosevelt] could take to avert the dangers that would so 
clearly confront the people of this country, as well as of the civilized world.”47  While 
Welles argued that Roosevelt chose him because he was the most available and capable 
person inside Washington to handle the job, Cordell Hull stated that Welles had 
requested to go on such a mission since the beginning of the August Crisis.48  Welles 
wanted his chance to broker peace since he believed he was best qualified.  Roosevelt 
asked Hull for a rubberstamp since the President had already made up his mind.  Hull 
made his objections clear, according to his memoirs.  Hell believed it was too late for 
peace missions and any attempt would lead to further confusion at home and abroad.49   
 Differences of opinion between Hull and Welles were to be expected.  Both 
believed that wars began due to trade imbalance and economics, yet Hull accused Welles 
of not having a backbone.50 Welles believed he should be Secretary of State instead of a 
broken-down old man.  In truth, due to Hull’s age and failing health, Welles did in fact 
serve as acting Secretary for most of the latter part of 1939.  In social matters, Welles 
played the role of chief diplomat since Hull disliked these functions.51   
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Welles had risen to his post through bureaucratic infighting and a personal 
relationship with the president.  Like Bullitt, Welles was a fellow New Dealer.  Yet 
unlike Bullitt, Welles had never strayed from the Democratic Party and supported  
Woodrow Wilson’s policies and thus stayed in good steed with the party machinery.  
Welles replaced William Phillips who went on to be ambassador to Italy.  While 
Secretary Hull preferred Walton Moore to fill the post, Roosevelt ignored his Secretary’s 
advice and let Welles, Moore, and Wilbur Carr fight over the position while staying 
aloof.52  In the end, Roosevelt’s decision to let the strongest survive would create bad 
blood within the State Department and cause its functional collapse in a period of crisis. 
 President Roosevelt had asked Cordell Hull to act as his Secretary of State 
knowing he refused to perform administrative duties that he considered menial.  
Roosevelt appears to have wanted it this way.  Many within Roosevelt’s inner circle 
even thought the “old man of Washington” which they called Hull would make a good 
candidate for president in 1940 save the fact he had no administrative skills.53  With 
Cordell Hull abdicating his role as administrator of the State Department, Welles’s 
influence became even stronger as he took on many of the duties that the Secretary 
normally performs.  With his close friendship with Roosevelt and his pseudo-Secretary 
status, it is easy to see how he came to see himself as above Bullitt and even Hull on 
matters of foreign policy. 
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 While Hull acted with caution towards Welles, Ambassador Bullitt despised 
Welles as an appeaser.  Welles did appear to advocate peace at any price.  Within the 
established foreign policy community, Welles acted as the head of a faction that believed 
peace could be achieved through negotiations and disarmament.54  This clashed with 
Bullitt’s firm anti-Soviet and anti-Nazi stance.  He feared that Welles would sell out the 
French, his adoptive nation, in order to maintain peace.  When the ambassador learned of 
Welles’s mission, he immediately cabled Washington.  Welles had “violated” an 
unwritten division of functions and had intruded on Bullitt’s authority.55  Like Hull, 
Bullitt warned that the French would see this last attempt as a sign of weakness and lack 
of resolve on the part of the United States.  Yet the mission went ahead and with Jay 
Pierpoint Moffet in tow, Welles visited London, Paris, Brussels, Rome, and finally 
Berlin. 
 Hull and Bullitt were correct.  Welles was the wrong man at the wrong time.  
From the very beginning, according to Hull, rumors spread as to the mission’s nature.  
Not only did it confuse the Allies, it weakened Roosevelt’s stance at home.  Isolationists, 
like Hamilton Fish, jumped at the idea that the Welles’s mission had the ulterior motive 
of making plans to bring the United States into the war on the Allied side.56  Even 
though Hull believed Welles followed Roosevelt’s instructions to gather information and 
seek out mutual understanding with the belligerent nations, rumors continued to abound 
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in Europe.  Along these lines, the French feared that Welles would turn his mission into 
a “last-ditch attempt at appeasement.”57 
 While America’s friends were confused, America’s potential enemies were not 
impressed.  While Count Ciano appreciated Welles as a gentleman “in appearance and in 
manner,” Mussolini thought Welles superficial and that any understanding was 
impossible.58  Mussolini’s aloofness made Welles more “depressed leaving the 
[conference] room than when he entered it.”59  Welles may have even given the Italian 
Duce the idea that the tough talk of the French and British was all bravado and no 
substance, thus giving incentive for further demands.  By March 17, the mission was as 
good as over.  Welles had failed to sway the Axis weak link, for Hitler had no reason to 
bargain.60 
 With the return of Welles, Roosevelt switched his attention from peace to arms.  
Yet the damage had been done.  The Allies could not be sure of where Roosevelt and 
America stood on supporting them.  Hitler viewed Roosevelt’s actions as those of a 
weak democratically-elected leader.  Nonetheless, the switch from peacemaker to arms 
supplier would contribute to the muddle of confused signals being sent by Washington.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CASH & CARRY AND THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY 
MARCH 1940-JUNE 1940 
 
 With the utter failure of the Welles mission, Roosevelt abandoned any attempt at 
brokering peace.  Instead, as conspiratorial historians assert, Roosevelt maneuvered the 
United States into a position as undeclared belligerent supporting the Allies.  Essentially, 
diplomacy between Washington and Berlin ceased, Ambassador Kennedy became a 
secondary player as Roosevelt communicated directly with Winston Churchill, and 
Ambassador Bullitt played lead actor on center stage. 
 With the closing of diplomatic alternatives, Roosevelt pushed for greater support 
for the Allies, both politically and materially. Roosevelt finally understood he had to 
court Congress in order to change the neutrality laws and move America onto a war 
footing.  Nevertheless, this would not be an easy task.  Members in the isolationist camp 
continued to try to keep America out of the inferno Europe was quickly becoming.  
Some like Congressman Fish wanted to explore the possibility that statements made in 
the German press were true and that Roosevelt had instigated the war through his 
Ambassadors (namely Bullitt).1  Others in the isolationist camp already began to 
question if this was an attempt to spread the New Deal abroad.2 
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 The tension between what Roosevelt wanted to do and what he could do would 
cause much confusion within the United States and among American allies.  Between 
the beginning of the war and the fall of France, the Allies truly thought that America 
would give more support than the Roosevelt administration actually did.  Like the other 
muddled signals, this came about due to Roosevelt allowing Bullitt to act almost 
autonomously and carry out his own form of diplomacy.  In the end, the fall of France 
caused turmoil within the United States foreign policy establishment and caused a race 
to reconstruct some form of order before it was too late. 
 
Neutrality Laws and Cash & Carry 
 Soon after the beginning of the war, Congress finally agreed with President 
Roosevelt to lift some portions of the Neutrality Act.  As Edward Stettinius relates in 
Lend-Lease: Weapon of Victory, the Congressional debate over revising the Neutrality 
Act never eased even in light of the war.  Opponents continued to fear that helping the 
French and British would draw the United States into another war just as the Nye 
Commission blamed America’s entry into World War I on similar arms sales.3  They 
thus made the revision eliminate the prohibition on arms sales only.   
The revised Neutrality Act passed Congress in November 1939. What would 
become known as Cash and Carry represented only a lifting of the arms embargo.  The 
French still could not acquire loans or aid from the United States.  France had to pay for 
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everything up front and the financial drain would soon become issue as the strain 
became increasingly evident.    
 
Business in France 
 Even with a war raging, American diplomats in France continued with normal 
business.  One such issue centered on modernizing the laws governing commerce and 
trade between the two nations.  The Treaty of Establishment, Commerce, and Navigation 
between the United States of America and France appears on the surface a normal 
document protecting the rights and privileges of each party.  Article 9, however, 
specifically protected American nationals of French descent from being conscripted into 
the French military.4  This article shows that American officials kept the effects of the 
war in mind even when revising normal means of diplomacy. 
 While normal diplomacy between the two countries continued, France (and other 
countries) continued to receive mixed signals from the United States.  While Bullitt 
cabled Roosevelt saying that he explicitly told the French that the United States would 
not enter the war, The New York Times reported Bullitt as saying that one of four 
policies of the United States consisted of 
 
moral assurances that the United States [would] leave its isolationist 
policy and be prepared in the event of war to participate actively on the 
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side of France and Britain.  America prepared to place her entire supply of 
war materials and finances at their disposal.5     
 
Speaking on behalf of the President to the press in 1940, Bullitt seemed to clearly 
indicate that the United States would enter the war as an ally even if Roosevelt did not 
order the deployment of troops.  Under this impression, Daladier’s optimism becomes 
understandable even if misplaced.   
 
Signs of Strain and the French Cabinet Crisis 
 Whereas Bullitt had painted a picture of a France capable and willing to fight to 
the end at the start of the war, by April 1940 signs of strain clearly shown through this 
façade.  Robert Murphy, Bullitt’s aide and Embassy Counsel, reported in his memoirs 
that French soldiers appeared far more fatalistic at the rail stations in 1939.  Gone were 
the cheers and accolades present at the start of the last war.6  Murphy assessed the 
situation as grim and morale as never being to the level made out in Bullitt’s dispatches.   
 While Murphy’s distance from both the French leaders and President Roosevelt 
allowed him to more accurately judge the state of moral readiness, Murphy also saw 
weakness in the French economy.  Murphy reported in April that the drain of skilled 
artisans and craftsmen from an economy based on small shops and few mass industries 
was causing severe economic and logistical problems for the French.  Even if the United 
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States opened up its vast domestic market to the French, Murphy argued that this would 
be of little use.  French exports had not penetrated an American market protected by 
tariffs, a subject not mentioned much before.7  Murphy raised the question of 
government inefficiency on the part of the French.  Bullitt’s aide also brought to light the 
fact that, beyond information supplied by the French, American officials must rely on 
“morsels” gleaned from other sources.8 
 On the military and political front, the French leadership had been shaken to its 
foundations. The Welles mission had not only failed to accomplish Roosevelt’s intended 
goals, but in crossing signals with what Bullitt was saying, Welles gave the impression 
that Americans believed that “Germany was invincible and that France and Britain ought 
to try to get a peace of compromise which would leave Germany in control of Central 
and eastern Europe.”9 Thus Roosevelt and Washington planners could no longer count 
on the French spirit of resistance.   
The French resolve and its political stability suffered another blow late in April.  
The French planners woefully underestimated how quickly the Germans could conquer 
the Scandinavian states.  Bullitt reported that Daladier expected German forces to push 
the Allies out of most of Norway quickly.  Bullitt hinted at a growing discord between 
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the French and British since the French were “bitter about the manner in which the 
[operation] had been handled” by the British.10 
Beyond the Allied discord, the French government was on the verge of political 
collapse.  Daladier told Bullitt that the loss of Norway would “produce most serious 
repercussions in France.”11  Bullitt assured Roosevelt that he did all in his power to 
shore up the French.  He cautioned his president, nonetheless, that if both Daladier and 
Reynaud were voted out, there are few political alternatives that would challenge the 
Germans. 
Even before the Germans had completed securing Norway, the French Senate 
secretly met to officially reprimand the Daladier government’s handling of the situation 
with a vote of no confidence.  Daladier had backed the Norway operation with the 
British, committing troops and naval forces.  He resigned due to its imminent failure.12  
Reynaud would take over the reins of government.  Yet even with being known as the 
strong man of Europe, the Reynaud cabinet would be a merry-go-round government 
ending with the Vichy-based, Petain regime.            
 
The Hammer Falls 
 The German attack on France beginning on May 10th did not come as a surprise 
to those in Washington.  Bullitt had advised Roosevelt that just such an attack would 
come.  According to the French, the Germans were late and risked the spring rains.  
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Nonetheless, France was engulfed in a cabinet crisis that William Langer noted left 
“France to face the greatest crisis in its history with a government steeped in distrust and 
factional rivalry.13  Historians cannot attribute the weakness of the French government to  
Roosevelt, as many conspiratorial authors do.  FDR’s close confidant, Bullitt, had failed 
to see this weakness and Roosevelt appears to have ignored other sources, nonetheless.  
As a catalyst, the Welles mission that Roosevelt approved initiated the crisis.    
The severity of the German Blitzkrieg shocked the French General staff.  On 
May 14th, Bullitt relayed French pleas for Roosevelt to sway Mussolini to refrain from 
attacking southern France.  The French had to shift all forces to the north, including all-
important aircraft.  The French also requested that Roosevelt plead with the Pope again 
in order to “excommunicate” Hitler and hopefully deprive him of support from any 
Catholic Germans or Italians.14 
 As Julian Hurstfield points out, Bullitt’s high degree of personal connection with 
the French government had the effect of transmitting the panic felt in Paris directly to  
Washington. Later on the 14th, Bullitt cabled Washington. Bullitt’s description of the 
situation was bleak.  German tanks had passed through the French anti-tank defenses as  
“if they did not exist” or were “made of straw.”15  Reynaud assured Bullitt that the 
French would fight on, but that “the French soldiers, brave as they were, could not stand 
against simultaneous attacks by tanks on the ground and bombs and machine gun bullets  
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from the air.”16  France needed aircraft.  From the beginning of the blitzkrieg until 
France’s fall, American planners became obsessed with supplying France with aircraft.  
All other information and issues became secondary.    
 
Planes, Planes, Planes 
 In the early days of the Second World War, political and military leaders 
appeared fixated by the possible uses of aircraft.  The French were no exception.  
Roosevelt’s tendency to rely solely on a close confidant for intelligence and information 
is best illustrated by Ambassador Bullitt’s constant calls for more aircraft for France.  As 
mentioned earlier, Bullitt made most of his connections at the upper levels of the French 
government. This would allow unintentional misinformation to reach Washington and be 
just as devastating as German disinformation. 
 As early as 1937, the French requested through Bullitt that the United States sell 
it aircraft for defense.  As covered before, the problem of the Johnson Act centered 
mainly on aircraft.  The question of aircraft would pit Congress against the president and 
executive officials against each other.  Beginning months before the outbreak of war, in 
January 1939, Bullitt relayed an increasing stream of requests from Daladier to 
Roosevelt asking for aircraft.  Ironically, many of the early requests were for Martin and 
Douglas medium bombers, offensive aircraft.17  French air force officers explained to 
Bullitt that they believe that their pilots were just as well trained as the German 
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Luftwaffe, yet lacked the aircraft to balance the scales.18  Air force officers were “very 
sure of themselves, and that [of] the force under their command.”  Nonetheless, these 
officers stressed the need for American factories to keep production up in order to 
supply them.  Germany would pay for any attacks on France, especially Paris.19  Until 
May of 1939, it appeared that France had steeled itself and that America only needed to 
lend a moderate amount of aid. 
 The opening of the German assault changed all that.  The French resolve was 
revealed as mere bravado.  From the opening hours, German coordinated use of air and 
ground forces caught the French off guard, and again, their panic became that of 
American leaders.  Accurate reporting and rumors became intertwined.  One of many 
dispatches illustrates the level of panicked reporting.  Bullitt relayed a report that the 
French had tried to evacuate children from the combat area.  Two German fighters 
swooped down, like hawks, and had machine gunned the column and littered the road 
with “little bodies.”20  Shortly after this report, other sources contradicted this by 
showing it only to be a hysterical overstatement. 
 The weight of German power overwhelmed all in its path.  Bullitt cabled 
Washington saying that Reynaud and other French officials “implored [him] to obtain 
more planes immediately and [were] exceedingly depressed when [Bullitt] explained 
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that no planes were available.”21  Since it appears Roosevelt relied on Bullitt for most of 
his information and relied far less on his other ambassadors, except for  
Murphy. 
As Langer and Gleason point out, French military weakness was evident in 
retrospect.  France had tried to prepare for war on the cheap.  The Maginot Line of 
defenses gave France a sense of security without the terrific expense of soldiers and 
equipment.22  France had just as many (maybe more) aircraft and tanks than the 
Germans.  The flaw in French strategy rested on the fact that while the numbers were 
there, they had the wrong types of aircraft, ill-suited to quick defense.  As noted by 
Secretary Morgenthau, the French did not start requesting pursuit (fighter) aircraft until 
the German offensive in the west had started.  By then, French request conflicted with 
American Army orders and time was running out.23  Whereas the Germans also used 
their forces in concentration, the French forgot the lessons of Clauswitz and Jomini.  
They, instead, used their forces as spread out support for static defenses.  
The one comparable advantage that the French had over the Germans rested with 
the French Navy.  Yet the sailors of France could do little as the Germans overran their 
homeland.  While American policy makers did not see a threat in the French Navy at the 
start of the war, it would increasingly worry many as the French fought for their lives.  
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Last-Ditch Moral Diplomacy 
 As the Germans stampeded over the French countryside, French Premier 
Reynaud asked President Roosevelt to use his good offices to stave off a two-front war.  
The French had been forced to deploy all of their forces to the north in order to meet the 
German onslaught.  This left few army units with no air cover to defend the French 
border with Italy.  Just before the German offensive began, Italy’s Duce mobilized 
Italian units on the border.  The thought of a two-front war terrified the French who did 
not want to get squeezed between the hammer of German forces and the anvil of Italian 
troops.  Without aircraft and mobile army units, the south of France appeared an easy 
target.24 
In a last effort to divert disaster, Bullitt asked Roosevelt to again plead with the 
Pope in Rome to ask the Pontiff to threaten to excommunicate any leader who attacked 
their peaceful neighbors.  Both men hoped that the threat of losing Catholic support in 
Italy and southern Germany would thwart an attack from the south on France and cause 
domestic unrest in both countries.25  Count Ciano notes in his diary that Mussolini 
scoffed at Roosevelt’s vacillations between threats and pleas.26  Again, Bullitt and 
Roosevelt misjudged the nature of totalitarian states. 
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Roosevelt also misjudged his own position in world politics.  The actions taken 
by Bullitt and his own words clearly placed the United States on the side of the French  
and the British.  The American president could no longer claim to be a neutral third party 
asking the Pope for help in the name of humanity.  His words of compassion and 
international law rang hollow as he asked the Catholic Church to take sides in a war 
where Catholics were on both sides of the conflict.  This may explain why when the 
Pope did speak on the subject, he did not single out Germany or Italy for condemnation.  
Instead, the Pontiff spoke out against the war in general and asked all sided to hold off 
further attacks and negotiate.  America could no longer ride its moral high horse and act 
as arms supplier to the French and British at the same time. 
 
Plane Envy 
 While Roosevelt’s moral diplomacy lost what little impact it had, French 
requests for aircraft brought Roosevelt into conflict with not only Congress, but his 
military chiefs as well.  Even before the beginning of the war, French observers looked 
at some of the United States’ most modern aircraft designs.  As early as 1938, France 
sent civilian and military observers to the United States to examine aircraft and 
production techniques.27  Most of the aircraft the French saw were known types that 
manufacturers sold internationally.   
Even with the French unable to buy directly from American manufacturers, 
Roosevelt created controversy by allowing French military officials to view current 
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production fighters and bombers that the government had not cleared for international 
sale.  The press heavily reported an incident where a prototype American airplane 
crashed.  A French air force officer was among those injured onboard.  The crash was an 
indication that the French were in the United States looking to buy aircraft and that the 
Roosevelt administration acted as a willing salesman.  Having American government 
officials helping the French appeared as a breach of the Neutrality Act, at least in spirit.  
Congress and opponents in the press also questioned whether Roosevelt intended to give 
away secret technology and designs.28 
The issue of whether Roosevelt was giving too much, both in quality and 
quantity, to the French infuriated American Air Corps chief Henry “Hap” Arnold as 
well.  Arnold argued against such transfers, and by 1940, Arnold’s criticisms of 
Roosevelt’s policy toward letting the French have access to cutting-edge technology 
almost got the air chief fired.  Treasury Secretary Morgenthau thought that Arnold 
verged on insubordination as he refused to allow the viewing by the French to view 
planes still on drawing board.  Arnold also openly voiced his belief that American air 
defenses were being sacrificed in order to fill the requests of the French.29 
With Arnold speaking up against his commander and chief, Congress asked the 
same questions.  By May 1940, many feared that France was a lost cause and that 
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modern American arms would only serve to help German armament designers.  With 
French defeat apparent by late May 1940, Congress wanted all available armaments to 
go to fill the American defense build-up.30  As both Congress and the Roosevelt 
administration realized that France was a fast-sinking ship, they began to appreciate the 
fact that American policy could no longer depend on the French.  This in and of itself 
sent the wrong signals to a ally that needed all the moral support it could get.      
 
America Hedging Her Bets 
 Hap Arnold’s resistance represented no unique incident but a growing trend 
within the American government.  By late May 1940, fate had doomed France.  
President Roosevelt and American officials quickly realized that if France fell, her 
colonial possessions would go to the victor, Germany.  Besides her African and Asian 
possessions, France had territory in the Western hemisphere.  Washington could not 
accept a German foothold in the New World. 
 Similarly, the French Navy had remained virtually untouched by the war.  With a 
total tonnage of 524,000 tons, the French had the fourth-largest fleet behind Great 
Britain, the United States, and Japan.31  While one-third the size of the British fleet, it 
represented a powerful force.  Officials knew that France had a capable and modern fleet 
that, for its size, had greater potential power per fleet unit than either the British or 
American fleets. 
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 Most of France’s front-line ships had been designed and launched in the late 
1930’s.  The Richelieu-class battleships had been built in response to Germany’s naval 
build-up and along the same design line as Britain’s Nelson.32  Along with the 
Richelieus, France had the two-unit Dunkerque-class battlecruisers.  In addition to these 
ships, France had two new battleships, an aircraft carrier, and other warships awaiting 
completion in the slips.33   
Completed in the late 1930’s or near completion, these ships represented cutting-
edge naval power and incorporated many features American ships lacked.  As noted in 
Jane’s Fighting Ships for 1941, which many naval planners cited, the 35,000-ton 
Richelieu could easily challenge America’s newest 36,000-ton North Carolina-class.  
More importantly, the Richilieu was operational.  North Carolina and Washington would 
not be ready for duty until late 1941.34  France’s battlecruisers were, in effect, 
lightweight battleships capable of challenging any of the U.S. Navy’s World War I-
vintage battlewagons. 
The American public did not ignore the size and capabilities of the French fleet.  
As early as April 1940, the President’s office and those in Congress began receiving 
mail from citizens concerned with the possibility that Germany would capture the 
world’s fourth-largest navy and add its ships to the combined German-Italian fleet.   
These letters urged the President to negotiate a trade of the French fleet, which seemed  
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inactive, for the outstanding debt France still owed from World War I and the present 
war.35 Roosevelt did not act on these pleas as long as France was fighting and instead 
used his energies to stave off total disaster. 
While the capture of the French fleet represented a treat to American interests 
abroad, French possessions in the western Hemisphere symbolized an immediate threat 
to the nation.  While Roosevelt appeared uninterested in a trade of territory as debt 
repayment in 1938, these islands crept to the front burner of American foreign policy.   
The island of Martinique took center stage.  Fort de France on the island allowed France  
to help Britain patrol the southern Atlantic and Caribbean while acting as a way-station 
between the United States and North Africa.  As the French collapsed before American 
eyes, the U.S. Navy began to take a keen interest in the small, tropical island with the 
“finest naval base in the world.”36  With German U-boats already lurking in the area, 
Roosevelt and his advisers feared that these wolves of the sea could harbor at 
Martinique.  Since American policy assumed that the Allies would patrol this area, the 
American Neutrality Patrol sent few ships to watch over Martinique.37  
Yet with the American public, the press, and Congress calling for repayment of 
debts, the French could not help but feel betrayed by the United States.  While there is 
scant evidence that America’s apparent cooling relationship with Paris helped bring 
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down France, it may have added to the argument of the peace faction led by Marshal 
Henri Petain, that was growing within the French government.  All of this would plague 
American policymakers as they tried to pick up the pieces of American foreign policy 
after the collapse of the French. 
 
The End Comes 
 From the start of the German offensive till mid-May, bad news continued to roll 
into Washington.  As it had in France, the disaster in Norway and worsening political 
situation in France had caused a shift of power in the British government.  Winston 
Churchill, former Lord of the Admiralty, became Prime Minister the day Germany 
slashed through the Western Front.38  Yet even with the exemplar of the British Bulldog 
spirit now leading His Majesty’s forces, the British could do little.  Reynaud pleaded 
with Churchill to send more British aircraft to the continent.  Churchill agreed but had 
few to spare.39   
By May 15th, Reynaud pleaded with Bullitt, asking for more aircraft.  The stress 
of the situation had made Reynaud unaware that America could not ship supplies quickly 
enough to have an impact on the current battle.40  Finally, many in Washington realized 
that the French had become “obsessed” with German airpower, blaming their defeats on  
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overwhelming German force.41  By May 28th, the Belgians had collapsed and the British  
retreated from the continent to lick their wounds after their rescue from Dunkirk. 
Churchill admitted to the British Parliament that it would be some time before Britain 
could reform its army and hoped for immediate aid from the United States.42  The 
French believed that they had lost well over 50,000 men holding the port open and now 
felt left alone on the continent to meet their doom.43 
The lull just after Dunkirk gave some in Paris a fleeting hope that the Germans 
had exhausted themselves and lost too much men and equipment.44  Yet this did not last.  
Italy soon joined the war and Reynaud asked Roosevelt to send the U.S. Navy to the 
Mediterranean.  Roosevelt refused, stating America cannot enter the war zone being 
neutral.  Bullitt asked his President for the disposition of American ships in the Atlantic 
so that he could calm French fears that their colonies would be protected.  Roosevelt 
denied this request as well.45  
Americans viewed Petain’s appointment as Vice-Premier on May 18th as a sign 
of hope.  Maybe the hero of Verdun could rally the French and hold the German 
advance.  Yet as they soon found out, Petain viewed the battle lost. On June 4th, Bullitt 
had lunch with the Marshal.  Petain implied that neither Daladier nor Reynaud had given 
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Bullitt a “completely frank view of the present situation.”46  Yet, as William Shirer 
notes, Petain had already convinced himself of France’s defeat and believed Reynaud 
called him back to “make peace and sign an armistice.”47 
June marked the end of the Third Republic and of American hopes for a 
satisfactory outcome to the battle of France.  As late as June 10th, Reynaud promised 
Roosevelt the French people would continue to fight if they had to do so from French 
North Africa.  A day later, Reynaud cabled Roosevelt informing the American President 
that due to limited supplies and America’s inaction, he had to seek an armistice with the 
Germans in order to stop his countrymen’s suffering.48 
France’s fall signaled a total collapse of American policy toward Europe.  It also 
signaled a disintegration of American prestige.  Even while isolationists, such as 
Hamilton Fish, argued that Roosevelt had misled the French, British Prime Minister 
Churchill claimed that America had the moral duty to enter the fray since it had 
encouraged the Allies to stand firm from the start.49 From June 1940 until America’s 
entry into World War II, Roosevelt and his advisers had to reformulate policy while 
figuratively governing by the seat of their pants.   
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CHAPTER V 
GOVERNING BY THE SEAT OF THE PANTS 
JUNE 1940 ONWARD 
 
To say that the fall of France complicated American foreign policy is a vast 
understatement.  France’s collapse signaled the end of Roosevelt’s policy of trying to 
have the war come out favorably for the United States without getting directly involved.  
No back-up plan existed.  The swiftness of the German victory caught the Roosevelt 
administration completely off guard and sent it scrambling to pick up the pieces of its 
shattered foreign policy after the battle was over.  From June 1940 till Germany’s second 
invasion after the Allied North African landings in November 1942, Washington had to 
reassess what was going on in France and how to deal with the French. 
France’s collapse created many important foreign policy and national security 
issues.  Even before the armistice, Roosevelt tried to secure the French fleet.  Such a 
powerful force had to be dealt with and neutralized.  Second, no one in the 
administration knew the status of France’s world-wide possessions.  Could the Germans 
use the French ports of Martinique or Mer-el-kebir?  If so, this would threaten British 
supply lines through the South Atlantic and America’s if the United States entered the 
war.  Finally, who was in charge in France?  Petain appeared sympathetic to the 
Germans?  Was he a puppet or the head of a collaborating regime?  Ambassador Bullitt’s 
reports had led America astray and during this period, American planners wrestled with 
what was real and what they thought was real. 
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 These three questions would plague Roosevelt and his advisors for the next two 
years. During this time, American foreign policy was ad hoc at best and sometimes 
shooting from the hip.  Policymaking was made even harder by America’s now-shattered 
reputation.  Like many in Europe, those in the Petain regime believed Washington had 
goaded France into war.  Roosevelt could no longer speak as a friend of France.  In the 
end, America had to bribe France into remaining neutral and limit the German spoils of 
victory.  
   
Who’s in Charge in Paris? 
 While France did not officially collapse until the signing of the Franco-German 
armistice, France was out of the war when German hobnails struck the Paris 
cobblestones.  At the time of France’s greatest need; as its leaders fled to the resort town 
of Vichy, American Ambassador Bullitt remained in Paris.  Bullitt’s flamboyant style 
may have led him to believe he acted on behalf of Parisians, but he gave the impression 
that America was abandoning the French government in its hour of need.1  Hull faults 
the ambassador for not maintaining contact with the fleeing French government and 
Bullitt’s deputy, while Robert Murphy raises the interesting hypothetical question of 
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whether an American presence could have steeled French resolve.2  These theatrics led 
to Bullitt’s replacement by Admiral William Leahy. 
 What in fact happened sealed France’s fate.  Marshal Petain rose to the 
premiership after the Reynaud government imploded.  On his first meeting with Petain, 
Leahy thought the marshal looked “old, tired, and worried.”  The real power in the 
government rested with Petain’s deputy, Admiral Francios Darlan.3  During this 
meeting, Petain stressed the need for American aid in the form of food and, strangely 
enough, cigarettes.   
 What troubled Leahy was the apparent close association Darlan had with Berlin. 
The admiral worried that Darlan planned to take France closer to Germany.  The 
numerous trips to Berlin the French admiral had taken worried Leahy.  Leahy’s fears 
were not unfounded.  As early as August 1940, reports from Vichy indicated that the 
French, while resistant, accepted a plan for “close collaboration with the Germans on 
such matters as imports, exchange controls, and emigration.4 
Similarly, America became increasingly unpopular in the French press.  While 
much of this can be attributed to Nazi coercion, the French printed articles lambasting 
“liar diplomats,” such as Bullitt, Biddle, and Kennedy.  President Roosevelt took similar 
abuse as the press claimed “influential persons” within the American government 
“push[ed] France into misfortune.”5  Roosevelt’s statements against French collaboration 
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only fueled the French discontent since they believed Roosevelt ignored their situation.6 
Because of this, Marshal Petain declared “France’s traditional friendships no longer 
existed,” with clear implication towards the United States.7  America now resided 
outside the “order” which France existed.  Petain and his subordinates (or handlers) 
wanted France to have a good position within Germany’s “new order” since the war had 
destroyed the old one.   
Admiral Darlan was a firm believer in this order.  According to George Melton’s 
biography of Darlan, while not being a fascist, Darlan believed that Germany would 
ultimately prevail.  He hoped that through cooperation, France could garner a privileged 
position in the new order.8  With Darlan making political ties in Berlin, Washington 
feared he would offer the French assets, such as its fleet, in return for German 
concessions.  With America’s traditional ties to France broken, the Roosevelt 
administration struggled to piece together a working policy.  No longer could Roosevelt 
use morality or diplomacy.  The situation was only made worse as the State Department 
entered a crisis that hampered its usefulness and pitted American diplomat against 
American diplomat.    
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The Breakdown at State 
 The collapse of the Third Republic also signified the eclipse of the State 
Department in foreign affairs.  The American State Department did not even plan for 
such a contingency and as Julian Hurstfield points out, used policies “still premised 
largely on the assumptions of 1940.”9  As the old assumptions proved wrong, factions 
sprang up to take control of the department.   
 The situation came as an outgrowth of Hull’s decision not to act as administrator 
of his department, but rather, advisor to the president.  As Francis Biddle noted in his 
memoirs, the situation went from bad to worse owing to Hull’s poor health.  What little 
energy the Tennesseean had he devoted to his president.  The absence of Hull only 
accelerated the breakdown of his department.10  Other members of Roosevelt’s inner 
circle considered the State Department as a set of “cliques and factions” where each 
operated independently.11  
 As de facto leader of the peace faction within the department, Sumner Welles 
abused his power to a degree in pressing Roosevelt for his peace mission.  Of course, the 
president allowed this factionalism to occur because that was how he maintained close 
watch on policy and his subordinates.  Welles’s private crusade so angered Hull, that the 
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Secretary singled Welles out and slowly sidelined his subordinate.  Hull had come to 
regard Welles as disloyal to him and stepping beyond his position. 12  
 Hull had help.  Welles’s nemesis, Ambassador Bullitt, took the Under 
Secretary’s mission as an affront.  As Roosevelt began to view Welles as a political 
liability, especially in light of his pro-Soviet stance, the president conspired with Bullitt 
to force Welles out of the government completely.  Details on it are sketchy, but press 
reports claimed that Welles had made homosexual advances towards men on several 
occasions.13  Ambassador Bullitt wrote to Roosevelt that Welles was both a political and 
security liability since he could be blackmailed.14  Bullitt had played a key role in 
eliminating his opponent by obtaining the services of FBI chief, J. Edgar Hoover in 
order to dig up incriminating evidence and get rid of his foe. 
 Yet the damage was done.  As the rumors swirled around Washington, 
conservative papers claimed Welles to be a communist.  Leftist papers countered that the 
department, headed by a fascist Hull, sought to eliminate the closest ally Russia had.  
Politics and intrigue entered diplomacy.  Eventually Welles would be forced to resign (in 
September 1943), but long before then the As Welles resigned in September 1943, a 
crisis at the State Department destroyed the credibility of America’s diplomatic corps.15  
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From 1940 on, the State Department played a diminishing role in foreign policy as other 
agencies, especially the military, took up the slack.  
 
The Question of Aid 
 With the American foreign policy establishment fighting within itself and 
American credibility gone among the new French leadership, the Roosevelt 
administration had to find another way to prevent the unthinkable: a challenge to British 
control of the Atlantic.  America had no friends at Vichy.  Daladier, Reynaud, and their 
subordinates were arrested and at the disposal of the Germans.16  The only ace that 
America held rested with France’s need for food and relief supplies.  American used 
bribery where diplomacy failed and force was not an option.  
From the very beginning, Marshal Petain asked for American aid. Aid in the 
form of food and fuel became America’s ace card when dealing with the French.  
Germany began immediately after the armistice to ship food from the occupied zone to 
Germany.  Aid was America’s only way to keep France neutral while staying neutral 
itself.  Upon arriving in Vichy, Ambassador Leahy spoke with Marshal Petain about the 
French fleet.  Darlan reassured Leahy that if he received orders from “any authority to 
turn them over to anybody,” he would scuttle the fleet.17  Petain then shifted the 
discussion to the question of aid in the form of food, medicine, and clothing.  Petain 
gave Leahy the impression that the French in the unoccupied zone were starving.  Leahy 
                                                 
     16 “Weddel to the Secretary of State, July 13. 1940,” file 851.01/76, RG 59, National Achives. 
     17 Leahy, I Was There, 12-13. 
 
 92
believed that America, by providing aid, could gain the trust of the French people and 
the Petain regime, thus pulling it away from Berlin’s orbit.   
Roosevelt, in turn, ordered Leahy to attempt to use aid as an incentive for the 
French to maintain strict neutrality.  Vichy agreed to inform Washington of all ship 
movements and dispositions.  In order to lessen the incentives for the Germans to 
attempt a seizure of the French merchant marine, French merchant vessels traveling to 
Europe from America had to have a counterpart traveling to America at the same time.  
In addition, the French assured Washington that no German agents would be allowed in 
French North Africa, especially Dakar.  Nonetheless, the question of where the aid was 
going to and of German infiltration in North Africa would threaten to destroy this second 
diplomatic structure. 
  
To Buy a Fleet 
Washington’s plans to rely on the Allies for control of the Atlantic fell apart with 
the French surrender.  Secretary of the Interior and Roosevelt’s close friend, Harold 
Ickes noted in his memoirs that the president worried the most about Germany acquiring 
the French fleet after the French defeat.  The new Churchill government reinforced the 
fears of Roosevelt and others by charging that Marshall Phillippe Petain and his second-
in-command and head of the navy, Admiral Darlan planned to turn the fleet over to the 
Germans in order to buy favor with those that controlled half their country.18  The rapid 
events in June 1940 left many questioning whether the Germans had already captured 
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some fleet units based at channel ports.  While the fighting still raged, reports coming 
out of France indicated that the whereabouts of the Jean Bart (sister-ship of the 
Richelieu), the battlecruiser Strasbourg, and other vessels could not be confirmed.19   
Yet, the French had saved their fleet.  At the last minute, the French moved any 
ship that could float to North African ports.  This included the partially complete Jean 
Bart, which wound up at Casablanca.20  Everything else, they destroyed.  Although they 
had succeeded in preventing their seizure, the French were finished.  The news only 
grew worse.  The original terms of the German-dictated armistice specified that all major 
fleet units had to be “demobilized and disarmed in ports to be designated by Germany 
and Italy.” 21  Some accounts reported that the fleet might continue to fight since most 
French ships were outside continental France.  While Darlan succeeded in getting the 
Germans to modify the original terns, the hopeful reports were wrong.  No major French 
ship defected. 
Overnight, the fears of many Americans seemed close at hand.  If the Germans 
acquired the French fleet, the combined tonnage of German, Italian, and French ships 
would outnumber and outmatch the British.  It was not just a question of whether the 
Axis could defeat the Royal Navy at sea.  As many in Washington knew, Britain could 
easily be shut off from its supply lines through the Mediterranean and starved into 
submission.22  Without the Royal Navy, America would lose is last buffer in the 
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Atlantic.  As pointed by Admiral Harold Stark in Plan Dog, a British collapse would 
leave a vacuum in South America into which the Germans could slowly encroach.23  
While Stark argued for a Japan-first policy if America was forced to fight, he did 
allowed that Washington had to secure the Western Hemisphere against the Axis before 
undertaking operations in the Pacific.   
In a speech before Congress, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox used just such an 
argument to justify the passing of the Naval Expansion Act of 1940.  The final passage 
of the act came as a response of the new threat to the Americas.  Knox argued that the 
United States had a “one-ocean navy” that was concentrated in the Pacific.  According to 
Knox, the fleet must remain there as a deterrent to the Japanese who might want to take 
advantage of French and British preoccupation.  Even with the expanded building 
program, it would be 1943 before America could build a “two-ocean fleet.”24  Knox 
went on to argue that America needed to help Britain contain Germany until that time. 
As stated before, the size and capabilities of the French fleet caused much 
concern in the American public as Americans wrote their representatives asking for a 
deal between America and France concerning their fleet.25  Soon Roosevelt could not 
ignore the outcry.  While not asking the French to hand over their fleet, President  
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Roosevelt cabled Vichy suggesting that the French fleet anchor in the United States for 
the duration of the war.  His stated rationale was to take away any incentive for both 
Germans and British to attempt to seize the fleet.26  Roosevelt’s overtures, however, 
clearly were directed toward keeping the Germans from getting the fleet.  As the only 
bargaining chip France had against the Germans, Admiral Darlan refused the request 
stating that the fleet was needed in order to maintain order in the French colonies.27  
Both houses of Congress also responded to the outcry by passing resolution asking the 
president to attempt to buy Martinique and other possessions in the Americas from the 
French and secure the Western Hemisphere.28 
 
Maintaining Neutrality 
 With America still officially neutral and the French refusing to send their fleet to 
a neutral port, Washington had few options and little recourse in the matter.  With half of 
France occupied, the Germans held an enormous political advantage over the French.  
Ambassador Bullitt, and later Admiral William Leahy, reported that the Germans used 
French POWs as bargaining chips in order to force the French to collaborate.29  The  
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harsh British policy toward its former ally only exacerbated the matter.  Churchill 
imposed a blockade of the continent and cut off supplies to both occupied and 
unoccupied France.  Economically, this drove the French closer to their German 
occupiers.  Shortly after the Franco-German armistice, Britain seized French vessels in 
British ports and treated their crews as prisoners of war.  Pre-war suspicion of the British 
and its navy began to surface among French officers, notably Darlan.30  Darlan, who had 
been an outspoken anglophobe before the war, took up his previous ways and made 
several speeches against the British.   
Tension over British seizure of ships and the stand off at Alexandria exploded 
with British Prime Minister Churchill making a costly political mistake.31  A day after 
the British seized French vessels in Britain, a British taskforce, commanded by Admiral 
Sir James Somerville, arrived off Mers-el Kebir.  At anchor there were the battleships 
Dunkerque, Strasbourg, Provence, and Bretagne, along with several destroyers.  This 
constituted a good portion of the French navy.  Somerville ordered the French to 
surrender their ships or sail them to the United States to wait out the war.  When French 
Admiral Marcel Gensoul refused, the British sank or crippled most of the ships.32  
British action led to a growing collaborationist sentiment within the French government 
and navy.  
                                                 
     30 Auphan, The French Navy in World War II, 125-128. 
     31 Auphan, The French Navy in World War II, 125-132.  
The British had given an ultimatum to Admiral Rene Godfroy, commanding officer of French units ported 
at Alexandria.  In it, the British demanded that the French turn over their ships, demobilize them in place, 
or be boarded.  From then on, the French sailors were de facto prisoners of the British. 
     32 Auphan, The French Navy in World War II, 125-132. 
 97
The attack near Oran led to the French asking the Germans for the change of the 
armistice terms mentioned before in order to allow the French to protect their shipping.  
In effect, the French began an undeclared war against the British.  At the time of the 
attack, British and French ships were at Fort de France in Martinique.  The immediate 
reaction on the part of the French worried many in Washington, including General 
George Marshall, that the fighting would spill over into the Western Hemisphere.33  
Although Churchill justified the attack on the grounds that the armistice was “bound to 
place the French fleet as effectively in the power of Germany” as French ships in 
Portsmouth were in British power, Washington felt itself between a rock and a hard 
place.34  Unlike the British, American policymakers had to rely on French assurances.  
Since America was neutral, American diplomacy thus concentrated on forcing the 
French to maintain neutrality at home at in its possessions.   
Acting in accordance with Plan Dog, Washington concerned itself with 
Martinique foremost.  Vichy promised Washington that it had no intentions to either 
fortify the island or allow the Germans to use Fort de France as a base for its 
submarines.35  Naval planners recognized that Fort de France would be a perfect 
submarine base from which the Germans could shut down shipping from South America.  
This being the case, American policy first centered on neutralizing the threat in the 
Western Hemisphere.  Stationed at Martinique, were several units of the French fleet.  
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The Roosevelt administration gain an agreement with Vichy that no ships stationed 
outside of Europe would return to France from their posts without getting permission 
from the United States.36  This applied to both warships and merchant vessels. 
Along with these assurances, France agreed to allow the United States to station 
observers in Martinique, Guadalupe, and French Guiana.  Admiral Georges Robert in 
Martinique was explicitly ordered to work with the American naval observer to take 
steps “as might in the judgment of the United States be required to avoid any disquiet on 
the part of the United States.”37  Washington also asked that American-built aircraft on 
the carrier Bearn be returned to the United States.  On this point the French refused, but 
the first American naval observer assigned to the island later reported that these planes 
were tantamount to scrap.38     
Yet, even without supplies coming from Europe and minimum personnel, naval 
planners knew that Martinique had fuel oil and supplies that could be useful to German 
U-boats.  Although Admiral Roberts at Fort de France observed strict neutrality while 
remaining loyal to Vichy, this question would lead to tension with the United States.  
Washington extended the neutrality patrols to Martinique even though the navy assets in 
the area were pitifully limited.  After a U-boat gained permission to off-load an injured 
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crewman, America lodged a complaint with Vichy and threatened to cut off aid to the 
unoccupied French territories.39 
 
The Final Breakdown 
 Germany appeared to hold all of the cards in regards to American attempts to 
keep France and its fleet neutral.  From the time of the armistice, Germany had made 
ever-increasing demands on the occupied zone of France.  Leahy reported to Washington 
that he feared that the Germans were withholding food in order to gain more concessions 
from Vichy.40  As a result of the starvation in the occupied zone, Vichy began to send 
food and other aid there.  These transfers clearly violated the agreement with the United 
States.  Washington wanted to avoid indirectly subsidizing the Nazi war effort.  If aid 
arrived in the form of American products, the Germans would have incentive to demand 
more from the zone.   
Evidence of collusion on the part of the French began to surface in mid-1941.  
Robert Murphy, now American counsel in North Africa, cabled Washington with news 
that his sources reported German activity in Algiers, Tunisia, and Dakar.  It also 
appeared that Germany was pressuring Vichy for a more pliable North African 
government. 41  If Germany took control of these areas, they would not only acquire  
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much of the French fleet, but the bases from which to operate.  The British and Free 
French had already attempted to seize Dakar but failed.42  Roosevelt agreed with 
London’s assessment of Dakar’s strategic significance.  If the Germans could operate 
from this West African port, they could close off sea traffic coming from Cape Horn.  
Similarly, if Germany forced Vichy to allow German operations from Tunisia, they 
could close off traffic through the Suez Canal.43  The real possibility of this caused many 
in Washington to question Vichy’s good faith.  
The question of the Japanese use of French merchant vessels in Asia also strained 
the Roosevelt’s faith in Vichy’s sincerity.  Even after the armistice, France wanted to 
buy munitions to send via their merchant marine to Indochina.  Washington feared that 
these arms would find their way into German hands or be seized by the Japanese.  By 
1941, Japan had gained permission from French Admiral Jules Terraux to use airfields in 
northern Tonkin and harbor rights in the region.  France asked America for support, but 
Under Secretary Welles replied that America could lend little support.44  
After the American Congress declared war in December 1941, Washington 
pressed Vichy to limit Japan’s use of French territory.  The administration stressed that 
France had to maintain strict neutrality or the United States may be forced to cut off aid 
to North Africa.  What Washington failed to realize was that Vichy had already lost 
effective control over its Asian territories.  Admiral Terraux, while asking for the arms 
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to fight, was forced to the realization that for France to hold any influence in the area, he 
had to cooperate with the dominant power, Japan.45 
Nonetheless, all Washington saw was that its enemies were using the assets of a 
declared neutral.  In addition, North Africa seemed ripe for German conquest.  To try 
and force Vichy back into strict neutrality, Roosevelt cut aid shipments to North Africa.  
Yet the plan backfired.  Between the time that the agreements between Washington and 
Vichy were made and mid-1942, Pierre Laval had retaken power in Vichy.  Petain 
remained a figurehead, while Darlan reverted to head of the navy only.  Laval was an 
open collaborationist.  With Washington breaking the aid agreements, Laval used this as 
an excuse to bring warships to Toulon in the unoccupied zone and denounced the United 
States.46  When Washington protested the battlecruiser Dunkerque’s move from 
Casablanca to Toulon, Laval argued that America had already broken its word and freed 
France from responsibility.  America and her newfound allies would have to find another 
way to deal with this belligerent neutral. 
 
Dealing in Force 
 The possibility of Germany controlling the entrance to the Mediterranean, the 
sea-lanes around Africa, and most of North Africa, drove American war planners to 
place North Africa as a prime invasion point.  American fears strengthened Winston 
Churchill’s argument for going after the Axis “soft underbelly.”  While most American 
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planners, including Admiral Ernest King, wanted to invade France directly, the threat of 
Germany cutting off shipping forced Roosevelt’s hand.47  By late 1942, American 
diplomacy would give way to an American invasion in North Africa. 
 America did not enter into what would become Operation Torch without 
intelligence.  As part of the evolving aid agreements with Vichy, Robert Murphy (who 
now worked for General Dwight D. Eisenhower) had made a pact with the governor of 
North Africa, General Maxime Weygand.  The Murphy-Weygand agreement was, on its 
face, a means for the United States to make sure that aid to North Africa did not end up 
in German hands.48  Yet, at its core, the agreements allowed the Americans to set up a 
clandestine intelligence network in North Africa and prepare the way for what 
Washington hoped was a peaceful invasion. 
 Robert Murphy best illustrates the position of diplomats after America’s entry 
into the war.  While officially Counsel to French North Africa, Murphy reported to 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower.  Just as Ambassador Kennedy no longer acted in the 
same capacity since Roosevelt talked directly with Churchill, Murphy worked outside of 
the diplomatic channels.  Diplomats now served the military, since the military acted as 
America’s diplomatic corps. 
 Prior to the invasion, American agents under Murphy tried to make contact with 
as many sympathetic French officers as possible.  Roosevelt had ordered Murphy to 
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North Africa in September 1940 hoping that he may find the most patriotic Frenchmen 
there.49  On September 21st, just as the Americans started to form an anti-fascist alliance 
with General Weygand, the British and Free French under General Charles de Gaulle 
began their abortive attack on Dakar.  The loss of men and damage to ships complicated 
American efforts and soured relations with many French officers.  Murphy reported that 
French anglophobia was the most intense among naval personnel after this attack.50  
Those in Washington hoped that Britain’s use of Free French troops would negate the 
anglophobia, but the French naval personnel viewed de Gaulle’s forces as traitors.51  The 
overall effect may have destroyed any chance for a peaceful invasion.  General 
Weygand, who commanded the respect of most Frenchmen was recalled to Vichy and 
replaced.  By mid-1942, Darlan arrived in North Africa to stabilize the region after 
Weygand’s departure on the pretext of visiting his son.  The man the Allies feared most 
as a collaborator now became the only way to secure French help.52 
 In his biography of Darlan, George Melton notes that as long as America 
remained neutral, the admiral remained committed to working with Berlin.  However, 
America’s declaration of war changed all of this.  Darlan feared that he would not be the 
one the United States supported and this fact added to the incentive to relieve 
Weygand.53  With Laval coming back into power, Robert Murphy told Washington that 
“due to a shaky political situation” Darlan will come to North Africa and may bring the 
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     50 Harry C. Blutcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), 116. 
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     52 Auphan, The French Navy in World War II, 200-225; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 76-77. 
     53 Melton, Darlan, 128-129. 
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fleet with him.54  While working as General Eisenhower’s deputy, General Mark Clark 
found out later that Darlan had ordered French intelligence officers to make contact with 
the Americans.  Clark called Darlan a political opportunist and did not trust this man 
with the “shifty eyes.”55  Darlan came to Algiers on the pretense of seeing his sick son.   
 Despite the political intrigue, American planners still assumed that the French 
would welcome them ashore.  Although General Clark secretly went to North Africa 
prior to the invasion to contact sympathetic French officers, French forces staunchly 
resisted the invasion for the first two days.  Many felt that they acted according to 
Marshal Petain’s wishes.56  Darlan did not help.  Clark became increasingly frustrated as 
the French admiral seemed to stall for time.  Nonetheless, Clark knew that Darlan was 
the only authority that the French troops would obey.57   
French Admiral Paul Auphan pointed out in his account of World War II that the 
Allies made the mistake of not coordinating with French units individually.  American 
troops came ashore where those loyal to Vichy were stationed and not the points held by 
Murphy’s contacts.  From November 8th to the 14th, there was no official agreement or 
truce between the Allies and French.  This being so, all French vessels became 
legitimate targets.  During the opening phases of French cruisers, destroyers, and 
submarines attacked American warships off Oran.  The incomplete battleship Jean Bart 
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opened fire from her berth.  The American battleship Massachusetts responded and 
dueled with the French vessels until Jean Bart sank at her berth.58 
 The lopsided battle ended when Darlan agreed to let the Allies use North Africa 
without upsetting its present governmental structure.  Clark had to virtually threaten 
Darlan with forced captivity to get him to back the Allied cause and not waffle.  The so-
called Darlan Deal upset many in the United States but Roosevelt supported 
Eisenhower’s decision since it brought French resistance to an end.59  As Clark viewed 
his contact with the man, Darlan was “a political investment forced on us by 
circumstance.”60  As part of the negotiations, Eisenhower tried to get Darlan to order the 
French fleet to North Africa.  Darlan refused, citing the fleet’s lack of fuel oil.  He 
reiterated his previous assurances that the naval officers at Toulon would never allow the 
Germans to get any of the ships there.   
The day after the Darlan Deal went into effect, American fears appeared to be 
coming true.  German forces attempted to seize the ships at Toulon.  Even though Darlan 
cabled Admiral de Lubard at Toulon to “invite” him and the fleet to North Africa since 
Germany had broken the armistice, de Lubard made no preparations to sail.61  Yet, to the 
surprise of the Germans, the French held true to their word.  As the French scuttled the 
majority of their larger units, American worst fear disappeared beneath the oil-covered 
waters of Toulon.  
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Just as the fall of the Third French Republic had caught Washington off guard, so 
did Lubard’s response to the German demand.  Ever since Bullitt had failed to provide 
adequate information before the war on the state of the French government, military, and 
society: America wandered blindly for a way out of the mess.  In the end, war did not 
help clear up the diplomatic mess, since France was never at war with America.  It took 
the French to solve America’s problem by defeating themselves. 
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CHAPER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The fall of France in 1940 was indeed one of the greatest crises in modern 
European history, but also a catastrophe for history as a discipline.  As Robert Dallek 
points out, the “’revisionist’ and ‘court’ histories of the subject that appeared shortly after 
the war were more polemical attacks and replies.”1  How the American government 
reacted to events in Europe became intertwined with politics and whether FDR was the 
greatest 20th century American president or its greatest swindler.  Conspiratorialists (like 
Fish and Tansill) base their argument on Roosevelt’s domestic politics and view FDR’s 
politics through the lens of post-war anti-communism.  In contrast, Dallek correctly 
illustrates how politics has corrupted the history of Franco-American relations.  It also 
clouds any attempted to analyze Roosevelt’s administration and see how its functioning 
affected foreign policy. 
 By looking at the “how” rather than the “why,” historians can continue to explore 
this topic while distancing themselves from political biases.  Instead of arguments based 
on the assumption that President Roosevelt knowingly fooled the French or that 
Roosevelt merely reacted to events, historians can see that other factors played a role.  
Historians have, for the most part, ignored Roosevelt’s mode of governing.  Scholars give 
FDR’s predisposition to govern personally rather than using normal channels only a 
passing glance and instead focus on personalities.  As the French case illustrates, 
Roosevelt relied mainly on Hull, Bullitt, and Welles.  Roosevelt wanted men of strong 
                                                 
1 Robert Dallek, “Franklin Roosevelt as War Leader,” The American Historical Review 76, no. 5 
(December 1971), 1503. 
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will, yet strong devotion to him alone.  They thus developed their own agendas and 
prescriptions for the situation.  Roosevelt avoided normal channels of communication and 
preferred ad hoc, personal interaction.  He gave the impression that each of these men 
was his most important assistant.  This led to each trying to gain the President’s ear.  
FDR welcomed the clash of personalities that these men represented.  The fights gave 
FDR a way, he believed, to maintain control over foreign policy.  
Roosevelt’s personal style of governing exacerbated this since no formal chain of 
command existed to smooth relations and balance the egos of the participants.  A 
fracturing of the foreign policy structure was the only possible outcome.  Roosevelt had 
used the idea of “divide and rule” in domestic politics to great success, but it resulted in 
disaster for American foreign affairs. 
 Historians also ignore the fact that Roosevelt preferred to keep all but his closest 
advisors guessing what he planned next.  Doing this, FDR tended keep his subordinates 
in the dark as to what their peers were doing.  This helped lead to the conflicting agendas 
Bullitt and Welles tried to advance.   Instead of FDR building a coordinated team that 
could possibly have dealt with the rapidly evolving crisis in France and elsewhere, FDR 
wanted to maintain his position out in front of American foreign policy.  He was also a 
consummate politician who wanted to maintain control of all aspects of American foreign 
policy.  In a manner, FDR acted as a micromanager but without coordinating his 
subordinates.   Thus, American foreign policy was doomed to be disjointed and 
incoherent. 
 The obsession with secrecy was not the only characteristic of FDR’s 
administration.  In the case of French relations, Roosevelt sought to build up France 
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while at the same time seeking peace.  As illustrated, the President tried to keep different 
options open to try to play both ends against the middle.  To avoid doing anything that 
would destroy his chances at the polls, FDR sought to get what he wanted while seeking 
a middle ground between isolationism and involvement.  Roosevelt needed to find the 
easiest way to carry out his policies, so he used his proxies to feel out the extremes of 
each possibility.  This became Roosevelt’s attempt at carrot-and-stick diplomacy.  He 
hoped the two policies would complement each other, but instead they contradicted each 
other.   
 Added to problems in foreign policy, domestic issues played a large role as well.  
Although this was not a domestic debate over taxes or a New Deal program, Roosevelt 
operated in the same manner.  The fate of nations rested on the perceptions of policy 
makers, but FDR treated his policies in the same way.  The degree to which the French 
deluded themselves cannot be totally ignored; nonetheless, Roosevelt’s pronouncements 
gave them false hope that America would awake to the threat and join the war on their 
side.  The President’s moral diplomacy failed while American vacillation between two 
extremes confused those Roosevelt hoped to support. 
 In addition, isolationists, such as Hamilton Fish, did not bother to coordinate with 
the White House on policy.  In some ways, Fish and others worked actively against 
Roosevelt’s policies.  Just as the administration appeared to have multiple voices, other 
voices spoke out for America. 
 The French planned their defense on the contradictory signals from the United 
States and lost hope after choosing the wrong voice to hear.  They chose to trust 
Roosevelt.  Was the policy espoused by Bullitt what Roosevelt would or could actually 
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do?  In times of crisis, certainties are rare.  Yet those issues that seem certain become 
gospel and policies are based on them.  The French based their strong stance against 
Hitler on the belief that they could hold back the Nazis with strong aid from the United 
States. 
When the American aid was not forthcoming, French officials panicked.  Their 
government collapsed and the French war effort suffered.  Yet they continued to hope the 
United States would come to France’s rescue, due to the impressions they received from 
Washington.  It does not matter whether America could have altered the balance, except 
that the French based their policies thinking that America could.  Yet America appeared 
to back out from involvement after stressing the need for the Allies to stand up to 
aggression.  When America seemed to falter and not live up to its promises, the French 
felt betrayed. 
Whether Roosevelt tricked France into war or not the point of which much of the 
historical debate revolves is irrelevant to a degree.  The fact remains that the French 
thought they had been betrayed.  After the fall of France, the sense that they had been 
betrayed helped bring the Petain regime to power. Daladier and Reynaud appeared to be 
American puppets or fools.  This complicated an already terrible situation.  With those 
sympathetic to the Allied cause tainted by the perception of betrayal, America could no 
longer offer its good services because of the lack of trust. 
With no friends on the continent, America had to resort to bribery.  There was 
nothing else.  Roosevelt’s contradictory foreign policy of trying to leave all options open 
had left no other option but aid.  Aid in the form of food, fuel, and commodities became 
the United States’ only foreign policy tool.  With the possibility of Germany acquiring 
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the French fleet, Washington bribed the French into compliance.  While this succeeded, 
the lack of friends within the Vichy requiem may have closed doors that could have made 
Operation Torch an easier victory.   
Normally when historians rate the greatness of presidents, Franklin Roosevelt 
ranks near the top for his leadership.  Some of this praise may be undeserved, as his 
policy towards France at this time clearly shows.  While traditionalists and 
conspiratorialists attack and defend FDR, those historians who understand Roosevelt’s 
method of governing, such as Robert Dallek, stand by the assertion that Roosevelt based 
his moves on pragmatism.  Others, such as James MacGregor Burns, argue that Congress 
was the greatest hindrance to an effective foreign policy.2 
Nonetheless, these historians continue to overlook Roosevelt as operator, driving 
force, and prophet to all those who made American foreign policy fail.  Bullitt and 
Welles would not have taken their places of prominence without Roosevelt.  Roosevelt 
allowed his administration to operate in an ad hoc fashion that was vulnerable to the very 
crises that overtook it.  As Roosevelt’s successor stated, the buck stops with the 
president.  Roosevelt had responsibility for the fiasco with France as well as the rest of 
American policy.  How he dealt with the beginnings of the Second World War show why 
it happened.  It behooves future historians to explore his governing style more in-depth.  
It may lead to further understanding of the substance of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign 
policy. 
                                                 
2 Dallek, “Franklin Roosevelt as War Leader,” 1503-1511. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Important Individuals in This Study 
 
General Henry “Hap” Arnold: Head of the U.S. Army Air Corps (Force) 
Adolf Berle: U.S. Assistant Secretary of State  
Francis Biddle: U.S. Attorney General 
William C. Bullitt: U.S. Ambassador to France, 1936-1940 
Winston Churchill: Head of the British Admiralty until 1940, then British Prime  
Minister 
Admiral Francios Darlan: French Admiral of the fleet, second-in-command to Marshal  
Petain until 1942 
Cordell Hull: U.S. Secretary of State 
Harold L. Ickes: U.S. Secretary of the Interior 
Admiral William Leahy: U.S. Ambassador to France, 1940-1942 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.: U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
Robert Murphy: Ambassadors Bullitt’s aid in Paris until 1940, then U.S. Charge’ de  
Affairs in French North Africa 
 
Marshal Philipe Petain: French Premier and head of the Vichy French government 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: President of the United States of America, 1932-1945 
 
Sumner Welles: U.S. Under Secretary of State 
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